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NOTES
REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING PETITION UNDER CHAPTER XI
OF THE CHANDLER ACT*
CHAPTER X of the Chandler Act' was enacted to "democratize" corporate
reorganizations of great size and complexity for protection of the investing
public. In contrast, Chapter XI2 was intended to operate primarily as an
expeditious proceeding for both individuals and corporations directed toward
reducing delay and expense of small-scale financial readjustments wherein
the public interest plays a minor role.3 Examination of the Act, however,
discloses a perplexing deficiency in criteria for determining under which of
Chapters X and XI a given corporate reorganization should properly be
conducted.4
In the first "full-dress" case 5 to highlight the defective interrelation between
the two chapters, United States Realty and Improvement Company, a large
corporation with security issues widely held by the public,0 filed a petition
for an arrangement under Chapter XI. The debtor was the holding and
management parent of real estate operating subsidiaries. Among them was
Trinity Buildings Corporation, of which the debtor owned the entire capital
stock. In 1919, for the purpose of facilitating sale of $7,000,000 worth of
twenty-year first mortgage bonds of Trinity, Realty guaranteed the issue as
to interest, principal and sinking fund payments. On the day preceding the
date of maturity, when default upon $3,710,500 in bonds then outstanding
was deemed inevitable, Realty filed under Chapter XI for an arrangementT
In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 15, 1940.
1. BAKRvPTcY AcT, 52 STAT. 840, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-1103 (Supp. 1938). Subsequent
citations to the Bankruptcy Act will refer to the section number alone. Sections of Chap-
ter X are numbered from 101 to 276. For a valuable section by section discussion of the
Act, in convenient form, see WEzxsTEI-. THE BAxNrt'icT," LAw oF 1939 (193S).
2. Sections of Chapter XI are numbered from 301 to 399.
3. See Rostow and Cutler, Compctizg Systems of Corporate Rcorgdanizaiion: Chap-
ters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act (1939) 48 YAt.% L. J. 1334.
4. This deficiency appears to be generally recognized. See Rostow and Cutler, supra
note 3; Levi, Corporate Reorganization and a Ministry of Justice (1938) 23 xi.. L
Rxv. 1, 25; Jackson, The N\eed for Amendment of the Chandler . let (1939) A3 Cor .
REORo. 35.
5. In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 13, 1940.
6. 899 individual investors held share certificates representing Realty's contingent
liability on a guarantee of another corporation's bonds; 900,000 shares of its stod: were
outstanding, listed and traded in on the New York Stock F_%change. Moreover, the in-
vesting public held sizeable quantities of other debentures of the company.
7. The haziness of distinction between a "reorganization" (Chapter X) and an
"arrangement" (Chapter XI) in the case of a large corporation attempting an extencive
shake-up of its financial structure was apparent in the district court's interchangeable
usage of these terms. Counsel for the debtor carefully emphasized the fact that it vas
seeking an "arrangement," by correcting the court's lapses in terminology. In re United
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of its unsecured obligation on the guarantee.8 Pleading inability to meet its
debts as they matured, the debtor offered a plan whereby the maturity date
of the certificates was to be postponed, the interest reduced and time for
payment of part of the interest extended. As an adjunct to the plan, pro-
vision was made for a subsequent alteration in Trinity's primary obligation
on the certificates parallel to that to be achieved in the guarantee under
Chapter XI.9 For this purpose Trinity was to be put through an entirely
separate reorganization in the state court under the New York Burchill Act.10
The Securities and Exchange Commission appeared as amicus curiae at
a session of the adjourned first meeting of creditors and urged the court to
dismiss the petition on its, own motion for lack of "jurisdiction." ' I After
failure in this attempt, the Commission was granted leave to intervene for
the limited purpose of contesting "jurisdiction." From orders denying its
motion to dismiss and referring the proceeding to a referee, the SEC filed
notice of appeal. 12 The debtor filed notice of appeal from the order allowing
intervention, and, in addition, moved in the appellate court to dismiss the
SEC's appeal. With one judge dissenting, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
States Realty & Improvement Co., Record on Appeal, p. 275 (hereinafter cited as Record
on Appeal).
8. This timely application by the debtor for relief tinder Chapter XI effectually
prevented its creditors from filing under Chapter X after default, since the Chapter XI
court could not be ousted from jurisdiction by a subsequent petition. Graham v. Boston
H. & E. R. R., 118 U. S. 161, 178 (1886); Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U. S. 1874).
Cf. Rostow and Cutler, supra note 3, at 1370-71. Before default, neither proceeding was
available to creditors, because Chapter XI is only voluntary, under all circumstances, and
facts essential to support a creditor's petition tinder Chapter X did not exist. See §§ 126,
131, 321, and 322.
9. Assent to the plan was deemed to include acquiescence in alteration of Trill-
ity's obligation; nevertheless, failure to achieve such alteration was not to affect the ante-
cedent modification of Realty's guarantee. Record on Appeal, pp. 33, 34. Pursuant to its
power to solicit acceptances even before filing of the petition, as conferred by § 336, the
debtor obtained consents from more than the required 50% of the certificate holders be-
fore its application for confirmation of the plan. In re United States Realty & Improve-
ment Co., Brief of SEC re Dismissal of Petition and Proceeding, p. 4, n. 7.
10. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 119-123. The Burchill Act proceeding provides for
reorganization through the device of a foreclosure and sale by the trustee tinder a mort-
gage bond indenture, conveyance of the property to a newly formed corporation in return
for its securities, and distribution of such securities to participants in the reorganization.
Certain procedural requirements must be followed to effect a plan; and, in the absence
of dissent by over 1 of the bondholders, the plan becomes binding upon all.
11. The term "jurisdiction," as here used by the Commission and the court, seems
to mean no more than the statutory propriety of the proceeding without reference to the
availability of collateral attack. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Batik,
60 Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S. 1940), 49 YALE L. J. 959; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S.
176, 181, 182 (1935) ; Vallely v. Northern Fire Ins. Co., 254 U. S. 348 (1920).
12. The Commission also moved to vacate the order continuing the debtor in pos-
session and to deny confirmation of the proposed arrangement, and appealed from all four
adverse rulings pursuant to provisions of §§ 24 and 25. For a discussion of these sections
and their value in eliminating doubts surrounding appellate procedure in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, see WEINsTEix, THE BANKRUPTCy LAW OF 1938 (1938) 64-68.
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the Second Circuit granted the debtor's motion and reversed the order of
intervention.'3
While, unquestionably, a Chapter X proceeding in the instant case would
have been more consonant with the purposes of the Act,'4 Chapter XI more
effectively served the interests of Realty's management. A well-founded fear
that a forced sale of Trinity's mortgaged property would destroy the equity
represented by Realty's holdings of stock in the subsidiary drove the debtor
to this roundabout procedure. If the strict priority theory of the Boyd case 15
were applied in the Chapter XI proceeding, Realty stockholders would
inevitably have been ousted from future participation in Realty's affairs.10
13. The same result was independently reached in a very similar case, decided Ehortly
after the principal case. In re Credit Service, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. f52,740 (D.
Aid. 1940). However, intervention was a less important issue in that case ince "juris-
diction" was attacked by a large number of debenture holders, as well as by the SEC.
14. In In re Reo Motor Car Co., 30 F. Supp. 7S5 (E. D. Mich. 19391, the debtr,
having filed voluntarily under Chapter X, moved late in the proceedings for transfer t.7,
Chapter XI. Although alternative grounds for denial of the motion wvere present, among
them the fact that the plan had provided for modification of the capital stock, not per-
missible under Chapter XI, the judge nevertheless based his denial of the motion upon
the theory that Chapter X was the proper chapter for corporations with publicly held
securities. A similar result was reached in In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., No. 7297
(S. D. N. Y. 1939), though the only outstanding indebtedness %vas unsecured. However,
the debtor alleged therein that falsification of its books barred its discharge as a banh-
rupt and prospectively prevented confirmation of any arrangement under § 316 of Chap-
ter XI. In In rc 'Majestic Radio & Television Corp., No. 716Q0 t. D. II. 1939) the
improper petition of the debtor under Chapter XI was opposed by the SEC; but, on the
.judge's recommendation, to save time, transfer to Chapter X was made by agreement
of the parties.
15. Briefly summarized, the rule of Northern P. Ry. v. Boyd, MS U. S. 432 (1913),
is that junior claimants may not participate in a reorganization until the holders of senior
claims are fully compensated. For a detailed treatment of the rule, see Rostow and Cutler,
supra note 3, at 1346-1352. Numerous decisions under old §§ 77 and 77B have held the
words "fair, equitable, and feasible" to embrace the dictates of the Boyd case. Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 8 (U. S. 1939). Hence, use of these
words in Chapter XI as the test of a proper arrangement gives reason to suppose that, in
light of the Case case, the Boyd doctrine will be applied to proceedings thereunder. Htw-
ever, inclusion in Chapter XI of the requirement that the arrangement must bZ "in the
best interest of creditors," a test taken from the old composition § 12, casts some doubt
upon the strict applicability of the Boyd case to proceedings under the Chapter. See note
16 infra. The SEC has taken a firm public stand supporting the strict priority theory.
See 'Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and ,Ilanagemcnt Undcr the Ptuolie
Utilities Holding Company Act of -935 (1938) 52 -L%%v. L. REv. 216, 247; Speech of
Samuel Clark, Chairman, Corp. Reorg. Div., SEC, before the "Practicing Law Course_,"
New York City, Jan. 5, 1939; Speech of J. Anthony Panuch, Special Counsel, Re.org.
Div., SEC, before New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, New York City, Nov. 21, 1939.
16. In the dissenting opinion of the instant case, Judge Clark assumed that the B.y3I
doctrine would govern in Chapter XI. A similar view was taken in In re Credit Service,
Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 52,240 (D. Md. 1940). See Rostow and Cutler, supra note
3, at 1352-1362. Faced with seeming inconsistency between the strict priority theory of the
Boyd case and the composition concept of Chapter XI, these authors nevertheless claim
that both compositions and reorganizations represent an application to different fact situa-
tions of the same equitable principle of making available to creditors the greatest p-osible
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But the courts have not yet applied the rule of the Boyd case in a Chapter XI
proceeding; and the debtor had reason to believe that the court would not
do so.' 7 Normally the state court could be expected to hold the Boyd doc-
trine controlling in the Burchill Act proceeding brought to modify Trinity's
primary obligation on the certificates,' 8 thus barring participation of the
debtor in the reorganization of the subsidiary.10 However, the debtor hoped
portion of the debtor's assets. They argue that, in old § 12 compositions of small enter-
prises with their good-will embodied in individual owners, this equitable result was deemed
achieved when creditors received their estimated share of a figurative liquidation, but that
the same measure for distribution cannot be used where good-will may easily be made
available to creditors, as in the case of larger corporations. If control or management has
value for the creditors, it should be preserved for them. However, where the continuance
of a corporate business is peculiarly dependent upon incumbency of the existing manage-
ment, it may be regarded as "fair and equitable," and "in the best interests of creditors,"
to permit stockholder participation in the reorganization. Cf. Graham, Fair Reorqanizatlon
Plans under Chapter X of the Chandler Act (1938) 8 BROONLYN- L. REv. 149-157. Al-
though, in the instant case. a majority of certificate holders was amenable to continuance
of the old management in control, this does not seem to have been indispensable to the
future success of Realty to the extent necessary to induce application of the Boyd rule
in the manner outlined above. See Record on Appeal, pp. 163, 164.
17. Application of the Boyd doctrine requires first and greatest sacrifice in reorgani-
zation from stock interests, for the modification of which Chapter XI makes no direct
provision. Conceivably, "catch-all" §357(8) may be interpreted to include such adjust-
ment. But, since the chapters were drafted in parallel form, omission in §357(1) of
Chapter XI of the provision in § 216(1) of Chapter X permitting alteration of stock in-
terests by issuance of new securities of any character, or otherwise, seems purposive.
Courts have not yet had occasion to follow the suggestion advanced in note 16 supra; and
it is more than likely that, with an eye to practice under the predecessors of Chapters X
and XI, respectively old § 77B and § 12, creditors of insolvent corporations will receive
somewhat more, and the stockholders somewhat less, under Chapter X than under Chap-
ter XI. See Rostow and Cutler, supra note 3, at 1361, 1362. As further basis for this
prediction, at least two cases under old § 12 involved composition of bonded indebtedness
by a large corporation with securities widely held by the public. In re Realty Associates
Securities Corp., 69 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); In re O'Gara Coal Co., 260 Fed. 742
(C. C. A. 7th, 1919). See also Mr. Justice Douglas's note 14 in Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1, 9 (U. S. 1939), which indicates a definite line be-
tween composition and reorganization principles, but for the purpose of reaffirming appll-
cability of the Boyd rule to 77B and Chapter X proceedings, rather than of answering
the question in respect to Chapter XI.
18. New York decisions adopt the Boyd principle. Chase Nat. Bank v. 10 East 40th
Street Corp., 238 App. Div. 370, 375, 264 N. Y. Supp. 882, 888 (1st Dep't 1933); Clinton
Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 793, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359,
364 (2d Dep't 1933) ; Rice v. Pound, 153 Misc. 226, 274 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ;
In re Lawyer's M't'g Co., 169 Misc. 802, 825, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 127, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
Even closer adherence to the Boyd rule will follow Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Pro-
ducts Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (U. S. 1939), which tightened up recent relaxations in its appli-
cation manifested in Downtown Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metrop. Bldgs., Inc., 81 F.
(2d) 314, 323, 324 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936), and in It re A. C. Hotel Co., 93 F. (2d) 841
(C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
19. For a discussion of the status of a parent in the reorganization of its subsidiary,
see Rembar, Claims Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganization (1939) 39 COL. L.
REV. 907, 914, et seq.
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that confirmation of the plan as it affected the guarantee, in the federal pro-
ceeding under Chapter XI, would influence the decision in the state court
on grounds of comity,- ° so that parallel modification of Trinity's obligation
could be achieved without disturbing Realty's equity.2 ' Thus, the strategy of
Realty placed it in a position to obviate effects of the Boyd doctrine entirelv.m
Furthermore, grave danger of unfairness in a plan allowed under the
debtor's attempted use of Chapter XI lay in the doubt surrounding the status
of "creditors not affected by the plan. ' '2 In dealing solely with the claims
of certificate holders, the plan failed to accord equal treatment to all groups
of unsecured creditors. Under Section 57(h) of the Act, "secured" creditors
whose security is insufficient to cover their claims may prove claims as
unsecured creditors to the extent of the debt not protected by collateral.
Chief among Realty's "secured" obligations outstanding were its own de-
bentures and its guarantee of those of a defunct subsidiary, the George A.
Fuller Company.2-4 In a Section 77B reorganization of the latter company,
Realty had offered to exchange its own debentures on an even basis with
those of the George A. Fuller Company, and, pending completion of the
exchange, to guarantee the latter's outstanding debentures. At the same time
provision was made for a pledge of collateral for both obligations, consisting
of voting trust certificates for the common shares of the successor corpora-
tion. The pledge was subject to defeasance by occurrence of a condition
subsequent, failure of the successor corporation to show certain minimum
earnings. Moreover, on the debtor's own admission, the pledged stock had
purely nominal'value. Accordingly, holders of Realty and George A. Fuller
debentures were probably in a position to prove claims as unsecured creditors
almost up to the face value of their certificates. Failure of the debtor to effect
a modification of these unsecured claims along with its unsecured obligation
on the guarantee of Trinity's bonds could result in discrimination against the
bondholders through creation of a preference in favor of the debenture
holders.
25
20. Counsel for Realty admitted such wvas the purpose of its program. Record on
Appeal, pp. 276, 277.
21. Although Realty owned over 9517r of Trinity's unsecured deli, in addition to itq
entire capital stock, forced sale of the subsidiary's mortgaged pr.t.erty wuld undoulit-
edly have wiped out this equity completely.
22. Had Realty's reorganization plan under Chapter XI entailed formation of a new
company, chances of judicial adherence to the Boyd doctrine would have been increased.
But doubt seems to exist whether or not such a plan could be effected under Chapter XL
See Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the Chandler Act upon Gencral .oIssetmcnis and
Compositions (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 763, 790, n. 170. Cf. Heuston, Corporate Re-
organications under Chapter XI (1938) 38 CoL L. REV. 1199, 123S.
23. See §§ 107 and 308.
24. $1,135,500 face amount of Realty's own 6q debentures, due January 1, 1944, .ere
outstanding; $1,203,500 face amount of George A. Fuller Company 6% debentures, like-
wise due January 1, 1944, were outstanding. Record on Appeal, p. 375.
25. But see § 351, which permits the court to divide unsecured creditors into clas' cs,
according to their nature and the exigencies of the particular case. XVa:srri, Tig
BANKRTPTcY LAw OF 1938 (1938) 276. This section gives promise of prolucing much
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Further, it was improbable that any plan confirmed under the Chapter XI
proceeding would have been practicable.20 The situation demanded the more
thorough-going shake-up of secured debts and stock interests, as well as
unsecured claims, that only Chapter X proceedings can achieve. During eight
years of depression, Realty's assets had suffered a phenomenal shrinkage.
27
After default by Trinity, the debtor's liabilities exceeded assets by a sub-
stantial figure.2 8 Recurring losses had been suffered over a considerable span
of time, and prospects of immediate improvement were poor.29 Under such
conditions, the adjustment sought could not prove to be more than, in the
words of the dissenting opinion, "a temporary palliative for an incurable
financial disease." The debtor would emerge from the courts still funda-
mentally a corporate cripple, with little or no assurance that it would not
be back in court again in the near future. Moreover, the practical necessities
of the situation, involving as it did the complexities of a parent-subsidiary
relationship, brought it within the domain of Chapter X, under which the
whole enterprise could be conveniently and thoroughly dealt with in a single
proceeding.30 No such possibility presents itself under Chapter XI, because
provision is not made therein for dealing with subsidiaries, or for altering
claims of secured creditors or stockholders.
In light of these substantive considerations, had the debtor filed under
Chapter X and made the necessary allegation that adequate relief 31 was not
available under Chapter XI,32 the court would probably have felt compelled
to make an affirmative finding that relief under Chapter XI was not adequate.
Yet, in Chapter XI, even though identical substantive considerations obtain,
such an affirmative finding may not be made, because the chapter contains
no provision for a preliminary hearing on the propriety of the proceeding.
Hence, paradoxically, a petition proper on its facts under Chapter X for
the reason, among others, that adequate relief is not available under Chapter
controversy in the future, a fact of which the parties in the instant case were well aware.
Record on Appeal, pp. 301, 302.
Prior to passage of the Act, it was held in J. P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri P. R. R.,
85 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), that classification of creditors should "in nowise de-
pend upon the nature of the claimant or his interest in the sense of his bias or leanings,
but only upon the nature of his claim."
26. Section 366 requires that a plan, to be confirmed, must be "fair and equitable and
feasible."
27. In 1930, assets of the debtor totaled approximately $123,000,000; in 1938, $23,478,974.
Record on Appeal, p. 55. Revision by the debtor in June, 1939, to reflect market values
and estimated values, reduced assets further to $7,076,515. Id. at 226, 375.
28. Before default, liabilities totaled $5,551,416; after default, the figure jumped to
$9,363,954, as against assets of $7,076,515.
29. Two series of publicly held debentures aggregating $2,339,000 were due January
1, 1944. See note 24 supra. On its own admission, Realty's prospects for future earnings
were not bright. Record on Appeal, p. 32.
30. §§ 106(13) and 129.
31. "Adequate relief" is a very broad phrase, the meaning of which will have to be
supplied by judicial decision. Moreover, "adequacy of relief" may relate to the debtor,




XI might nevertheless be filed under Chapter XI and remain unquestioned
on the issue of adequacy of relief until the hearing on confirmation of the
plan.
33
The facts of the instant case would, under Section 77B, have justified
dismissal of the petition on the ground that such a petition was not filed in
"good faith." That term was used in administration of Section 77B, and
has now been accepted in Chapter X, to support broad judicial discretion
in refusing petitions where, as here, the prospects of achieving a fair and
reasonably thorough reorganization were slim. Preliminary inspection of
the financial problem presented by the petition often was followed by dis-
missals where no reasonable chance of obtaining adequate relief under Sec-
tion 77B was apparent.34 But Chapter XI, like Section 75,35 and unlike
Section 77 and Chapters IX, X and XII, contains no provision requiring
petitions to be filed in "good faith." Recently, the Supreme Court, in John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Barcls,O gave the provision for
"good faith" in the proposal of a plan under Section 75 a more limited mean-
ing than that attached to the comparable language in Section 77B. Reversing
the lower court's dismissal of the farmer-debtor's petition, the court held
that neither the terms nor the purpose of Section 75 warranted any imputation
of lack of "good faith" to a farmer-debtor because of the absence of a
reasonable probability of his financial rehabilitation. However, since the
philosophy of Section 75 seems to be one of delay for the benefit of a favored
class of debtors, while that of Chapter XI is one of speedy reorganization,
it is unlikely that the standard of "good faith" under Chapter XI will be
so advantageous to debtors as that indicated in the Bartels case. But in view
of the omission in Chapter XI of express requirement that petitions be filed
in "good faith," it is likewise improbable that the more exacting standards
of "good faith" applied under Section 77B will be followed under Chapter XI.
Instead, courts will, in all likelihood, seek some middle ground.
Aside from the possibility of an implied requirement of "good faith" in
filing a petition under Chapter XI, Realty's compliance with the technical
requirements of the chapter was impeccable. The debtor was a "person"
who could become a bankrupt within the meaning of Section 4;37 proper
allegations of insolvency were made, and a plan offered affecting only an
unsecured obligation. Within the literal terms of the Act, its petition was
33. § 366.
34. Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Blank, 29 U. S. 18 (1936); 1Manati Sugar
Co. v. MYock, 75 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). See also Gerdes, "Good Faith" in the
Initiation of Proceedings mnder Section 77B ,f the Bankruptcy let (1935) 23 Gr,,. L J.
418.
35. 49 STAT. 943. 11 U. S. C. §203 (1935).
36. 60 Sup. Ct 221 (U. S. 1939).
37. Section 4(a) permits any "person"f to become a voluntary banlrupt "eVcet a
municipal, railroad, insurance or banking corporation, or a building and loan associatiun'
Section 306(3) makes Chapter XI available to any person who could become a bantrupt
under § 4. In so far as it appears from the record, Realty had committed no acts barring
its discharge as a bankrupt under § 14, such as would prevent confirmation of an ar-
rangement under § 366(4). See In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., No. 72697 (S. D. X. Y.
1939), discussed in note 14 supra.
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therefore not subject to dismissal before the hearing on confirmation of the
plan. Possibly a clear showing that the court had abused its discretion by
holding action on the confirmation in abeyance and wrongfully refusing to
dismiss the petition would have moved a court of review to find error on
appeal from the order of denial. However, no such treatment of the SEC's
motion to dismiss Realty's petition could be inferred from the action of the
district court in endeavoring to effect a compromise among the parties and,
for that purpose, withholding judgment on the plan until amendments thereto
should have proved patently useless. 38
Even the provisions of the Act governing intervention by the SEC operated
in favor of the debtor. While Section 208 of the Act expressly authorizes
intervention by the Commission in a Chapter X proceeding upon request of
the judge or upon its own motion, if approved by the judge, it forbids the
Commission to appeal from any order entered in such a proceeding.80 And
Chapter XI is completely devoid of permission for the SEC to intervene.
Nevertheless, there is no compulsion toward the position of the court that
the SEC had neither a right to intervene, even for the limited purpose of
contesting "jurisdiction," nor a right to appeal from an adverse ruling
thereon. The Commission relied, not on the terms of the Act, but upon
Rule 24(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in conjunction with
the broad purpose underlying the Act.40 The Rule creates a right of inter-
vention, extraneous to provisions of the statute,, where "the representation
of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the applicant is or may be bound 4' by a judgment in the action." 42 The
38. The proceeding barely escaped dismissal in the district court after the hearing
on confirmation of the plan, but was held open pending amendment of the plan by the
debtor, subject to the condition of immediate payment of 11/2,% interest as a sop to dis-
satisfied certificate holders. Record on Appeal, pp. 359, 360. Only the overwhelming
number of certificate holders opposed to dismissal made this compromise possible. Id. at
352 et seq. Chief objection voiced against use of Chapter X was its undue expense and
delay. Id. at pp. 353, 355, 358. However, even the heartiest exponents of Chapter XI
seemed troubled by the absence of provision therein for separate bond-holders' committees.
Id. at pp. 183, 214, 252.
39. See MOORE's BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 561, 562.
40. Grounds upon which the district court made its order allowing intervention by
the Commission were at first ill-defined, but subsequently the court expressly based the
order upon Federal Rule 24(a) (2). Record on Appeal, p. 336. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy. Federal Rule 81(a) (1) and
General Orders in Bankruptcy XXXVII and XLVIII. Rule 24(a) (2) constitutes, in
general, a mere application and restatement of the earlier equity practice. See 2 MooaE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2325. However, one substantial change effected by the rule
has been to abolish the old doctrine of Equity Rule 37 that intervention must be in sub-
ordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding. Id. at 2326. If
the intervenor's right of intervention is absolute, his attack on the propriety of the pro-
ceeding may not be met by the subordination rule in any event. Id. at 2379 et seq.
41. The concept of being "bound" by a judgment, in this connection, has been held
to include "probable prejudice" to the applicant as a result of the judgment. Percy Sum-
mer Club v. Astle, 110 Fed. 486, 488 (C. C. N. H. 1901).
42. The right of intervention created by Rule 24(a) (2) is to be liberally construed.
Rules 1 and 61 so indicate. Moreover, there has been judicial recognition that such is the
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function of the SEC, in accordance with the legislative premise on which the
Act is based, is to protect the widely scattered and disorganized investing
public through impartial supervision of reorganizations in which the public
has a stake.43 Therefore, it can be argued that, in so far as initiation of a
Chapter XI preceeding by a debtor with security issues widely held by the
public, as in the instant case, threatens to impair performance by the SEC
of its statutory duties, the Commission has an interest in the litigation suffi-
cient to allow its intervention. " Sufficiency of the SEC's interest in the
proceeding finds substantiation in cases in which state bank commissioners
have been permitted to intervene in federal receiverships for protection of
their duties under statute to take possession of and administer the assets
of insolvent banks.45 While custodianship differs from the bare right of
supervision contended for by the SEC, the distinction lies only in the extent
and incidents of supervisory control, not in its nature. Both the SEC and
the state bank commissioners had as their primary interest the fair and
equitable disposition of the assets of insolvents.
Mloreover, intervention for the limited purpose of attacking "jurisdiction"
must be distinguished from the right to intervene and dispute questions aris-
ing in the course of proceedings once they are properly under wav. 6 The
case. United States v. C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
See also 2 MooRa, FEDERAL Pr-xcricE (1938) 2365.
43. See the statement of William 0. Douglas, as Commissioner of the SEC. in HIcar-
ings before the Committee of the Judicary on H. R. &S4., 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)
162 et seq. As indicated therein, the SEC wvas itself the author of many provisions re-
flecting this premise. See also Montgomery. Defects in Chapter XI of the Ba~n!rnptcy,
Act and Suggested Amendments (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 081, q,2; Clark, The Securiti s
and Exchange Commission and the Chandler Act (1939) 73 U. S. L. Rv. 147.
44. While the so-called broad view of intervention, \\iere the Federal Government
was concerned in the outcome of litigation, found early expression in The E.change, 7
Cranch. 116 (U. S. 1812), courts have nevertheless generally allowed government inter-
vention on the basis of some pecuniary or proprietory interest in the pr, ceeding. Xornan
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 89 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Davis v. Boston & M.
R. R., 89 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937). Somutimes the facts have nut too clearly
supported allegations of such interest; yet intervention has been allowed. Florida v.
Georgia, 17 How. 478 (U. S. 18 4) (boundary dispute between two states) ; New York
v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921) (suit to enjoin pollution of harbor). Presence of a
general public interest tends to blur the requirements. Often the proprietary interest relied
upon has been formal, amounting in fact to a general public interest. See Percy Summer
Club v. Astle, 110 Fed. 486 (C. C. N. H. 1901); Winola Lake and Land Co. v. Gorham,
17 F. Supp. 75 (M. D. Pa. 1936). Many cases seemingly contra are readily distinguish-
able on the ground that the public interest is adequately represented without intervention.
See New York City v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U. S. 312 (1923); Chicago v. Chicago
Rapid Transit Co., 284 U. S. 577 (1931).
45. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935) ; Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U. S.
186 (1935). Intervention in these cases was not contested, but the allowance of interven-
tion indicates that the interest of the state bank commissioners ,ms deemed suficient.
The distinction sometimes made between the sovereign and an agency of the sovereign for
other purposes apparently did not affect the right of intervention here. See also Hopkins
v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 337 et seq. (1935).
46. Opportunity to make preliminary attacks upon the propriety of the prezeeding
does not entail the possible dilatory effect of complete intervention. Hence, fear that ex-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
latter power was not sought by the SEC. But the former is a prime requisite
for the Commission, if it is expected to preserve the elaborate safeguards of
Chapter X from the emasculatory effects of improper resorts to Chapter XI. 47
Were it admitted that denial of an absolute right to intervene was correct,
there is still no reason why the order of intervention could not have been
sustained as a proper exercise of judicial discretion, pursuant to Federal
Rule 24(b) (2).48 And, once intervention has been granted, whether per-
missive or absolute, the intervenor has the right to appeal from all inter-
locutory or final orders which affect him, and from which an appeal is
provided by statute.49 When intervention is accorded the SEC under the
Federal Rules, not under the Act, the Commission's status is that of an
ordinary party in the proceedings; and the basis of its appeal is the same
as that of such a party. 0 Therefore, absence of provision for appeal by the
SEC in Chapter X, being for this purpose solely evidence of the policy behind
the Act, goes to the discretion of the lower court in allowing the appeal,
rather than to its powers, or to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of
review. Allowance of the appeal, in a case involving highly import nt ques-
tions of statutory construction, seems to have been a reasonable exercise of
discretion. Such reasoning would have buttressed the court's determination
of the "jurisdictional" issue against possible later attack on grounds that,
since the issue was never properly raised and was therefore unnecessarily
decided, disposition thereof constituted dictum.
Even though open to such attack, the court's disposition of the case repre-
sents a sensible and practical course of judicial action. Two omissions in
Chapter XI compelled the court to uphold the propriety of the Chapter XI
proceeding. No provision can be found in Chapter XI for a preliminary
hearing on the propriety of the proceeding; nor is there any clause making
want of "good faith," whether in the form of prospective inadequacy of relief
or some other form, grounds for immediate dismissal. Thus there was no
express statutory basis, in the early stages of the proceeding, for arguing
that a corporation with securities widely held by the public was not suited
to a proceeding under Chapter XI.
The omission of a preliminary hearing could be supplied by amendment
without unreasonably impairing expediency of the chapter. But even with
peditiousness of the proceeding might suffer, which is the principal reason for forbidding
complete intervention, offers less compulsion toward denial of limited intervention.
47. Inertia of the investing public being a recognized consideration in SEC supervi-
sion of reorganizations, it seems inconsistent to call off the statutory watch-dog in the
belief that the investor can be expected to take the initiative in protecting his own inter-
ests.
48. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Clark, himself an author of the Federal Rules,
pointed out the applicability of Rule 24(b) (2), which provides for permissive interven-
tion when the petitioner has an interest in a question of law or fact common to the
pending litigation. This discretionary right has been described as a "matter of trial con-
venience." 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE (1938) 2332. Hence, if used as a device to make
possible the interpretation of an important statute, Rule 24(b) (2) would seem to be with-
in the scope of its intended function.
49. See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE (1938) 2371.
50. See note 12 supra.
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the Act in its present form, a possible solution of the difficult), is implicit in
the general equity powers of the court.r' Some basis for a creditor's motion
to dismiss for want of "good faith" may be derived by implication from
Section 312 of the Act, which renders jurisdiction of a Chapter XI court
comparable to that of a bankruptcy court on adjudication. It is a well-recog-
nized informal practice in bankruptcy to permit creditors to raise the question
of jurisdiction and to appeal from an adverse ruling thereon, even in cases
where they do not have full standing as parties before the court5 2 And if the
SEC is accorded the status of a party for the sole purpose of contesting
"jurisdiction," it seemingly should enjoy rights commensurate with those
of creditors for that limited purpose. A further suggestion, having the ad-
vantage of effecting a transfer of proceedings from ,Chapter XI to Chapter X
instead of merely a dismissal of the Chapter XI proceeding, would be to
consider filing of the petition under Chapter XI as an act of bankruptcy and
on the basis thereof permit creditors to file an involuntary petition under
Chapter X.5 To reach either of these results an inference must be unearthed
from Chapter XI that prospective inadequacy of relief thereunder renders
the proceedings subject to dismissal. WNhile the provision in Chapter XI
making it a prerequisite to confirmation of the plan that the proposal and its
acceptance be "in good faith" enjoys sufficient elasticity to support an argu-
ment to this effect, absence in Chapter XI of the provision for a preliminary
hearing present in Chapter X indicates a contrary legislative intent.
The mechanical defects discussed bid fair to cause a breakdown in the
accomplishment of the purposes commonly supposed to underlie the two
chapters.5 Speedy, but well-considered, legislative amendment appears to
51. Judge Clark pointed this out in his dissent. See also Rosto%. ard Cutler, smrah
note 3, at 1366, 1367.
52. General creditors have no such standing in a voluntary procceding in ,ail:rurpcy
as to allow them to file an answer or move to vacate an adjudication, but this fact haq
not prevented them from properly raising the question of jurisdicti,'i. R',Yal Indemnity
Co. v. American Bond & MX\tg. Co., 61 F. (2d) 875 t C. C. A. 7th, 1932 t, a F'd, 2,9 U'. S.
165 (1933) ; In re Ettinger, 76 F. (2d) 741 (C. C. A. 2d. 1935) ; Chicago Pan!: of C'.m-
merce v. Carter, 61 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 8th, 1')32) . Vas-ar Foundry Co. v. Whiting
Corp., 2 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) ; Blackst,ck v. Dlackt,. ck, 245 Fed. 249 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1920); In re Guanacei Tunnel Co., 201 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 2d. 1912 1; Ih re
Nash, 249 Fed. 375 (S. D. W. Va. 1918).
53. Such reasoning has a difficult hurdle to jump whin it lI-ec.n, nLccssary to fPnd
that the Chapter X petition supersedes the prior petition unider Chapter XI, thus ousting
the Chapter XI court from jurisdiction. For analysis of these diffimultit and a svlutin
thereof, see Rostow and Cutler, supra note 3. at 136S el sc-7.
54. Not only may many corporations in a prositikn similar to that 4f Rcalty employ
the same tactics; but others could immunize their equities in prol erties against possible
future divestment under a Chapter X proceeding by setting up subsidiaries and c,.nvev-
ing the properties to them. But, in the instant case, although the manner of effectuating
the plan was devious, it is not certain that it was unfair. Ulterior imtives canniwt ju4ly
be ascribed to the institutional holders contributing most of the consents. Pursuant to the
New York -Mortgage Moratorium Act, a deficiency judgment under forechlsure of Trin-
ity's mortgaged property would have been limited to the difference Letvwcen the mortgage
bond debt and the "fair value" of the property by judicial appraial. X. Y. Civ. Pln\w.
Acr §§ 1077(a), 1083. Certificate holders feared, and the debtor 1,elieved, that such a
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be the only practical solution. While out of court arrangements and reor-
ganizations, on threat of prolonged and expensive litigation upon refusal to
accept the terms offered, 55 and increased use of state machinery,50 as exem-
plified by the instant case, are possible loopholes in the Act, the broadest
avenue of escape from the regulatory provisions in Chapter X consists of
improper resort to Chapter XI. Hence, clarification of the interrelation be-
tween the two chapters is prerequisite to effective administration of the Act.
Unless the "jurisdictional" disputes now prevalent can be avoided, the avowed
mission of Chapter XI to provide expeditious tools for settling small problems
of reorganization will meet with failure. 7 And if the protective functions of
Chapter X can be conveniently thwarted by abuse of Chapter XI, one of
the most comprehensive corporate reforms ever effected may prove to have
been a delusive dream.
APPROPRIATE HOLDING PERIOD FOR CAPITAL GAINS TAX
AS DETERMINED ON AVERAGE COST BASIS*
THE requirement of the Federal Income Tax Act that the entire gain or
loss realized upon the sale of securities be reported in a single year' works
a grave injustice to either taxpayer or Government in those instances where
the gain or loss has accrued gradually over a period of years. To compensate
partially for this inequity, Congress has granted special dispensation to those
deficiency would be inconsequential in amount. Record on Appeal, pp. 164, 353. Since, if
this expectation materialized, the debtor would be free of its obligation on the guarantee,
and since remedies as to principal must first be exhausted against the primary obligor, the
debtor was justified in claiming that its p'an offered something to the certificate holders
that they did not already have, a continuing investment. However, the question whether
or not the plan was a fair compromise cannot be answered with any definiteness.
55. Complete suppression of such tactics must probably await revision of the incor-
poration laws on a national scale. The competitive psychology which drives state incor-
poration laws into deeper and deeper morasses of ineffectiveness gives little promise of
bringing about improvement in out of court reorganization standards. See Bresnahan,
Will Provisions of the Chandler Bill Extending SEC Powers Afford Adequate Protection
to Corporate Investors? (1938) A 1 CORP. REORG. 342. Suggested methods of introducing
Federal Incorporation to cover reorganization problems find expression in Teton, Reorg-
anization Revised (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 573, 607 et seq.; Levi, Corporate Reorganization
and a Ministry of Justice (1938) 23 MINN. L. REv. 1, 20.
56. Advantages of state proceedings in evading the much less strict § 77B proceedings
were beginning to be appreciated before the advent of Chapter X. See Comment (1938)
36 MICH. L. REv. 434.
57. However, in the "reorganization" or "arrangement" of real estate properties, as
in the instant case, dilatory proceedings do not spell disaster, as they might in the case
of manufacturing concerns. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on S. 8o.16,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938) 85.
* William E. Mitchell, 40 B. T. A. 424 (1939).
1. INT. REV. CODE §41 (1939).
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whose securities have been held for a long term. Thus in the earlier revenue
acts, 2 Congress taxed long term security gains at a flat 123 rate, while
levying upon short term gains as ordinary income. In later acts3 this same
objective has been accomplished by treating as income varying proportions
of the gain realized, dependent upon the length of time the security has been
held. Thus, before computing taxable gain or deductible loss realized from
the sale of securities, it is imperative to determine the cost basis of the
security sold and the period for which it was held. Yet Congress, although
attaching great importance to the holding period,4 has not indicated an ap-
propriate method to determine which particular securities among the total
holdings of the same class are to be treated as sold. Instead the task has
been delegated to the Treasury Department. The resulting Treasury regula-
tions have permitted the taxpayer to identify0 or otherwise to designate7
2. E.g., RENUE AcT OF 1921, § 206; REVENUE Act oF 1932, § 101.
3. REVNUE Act OF 1934, § 117; REVENU-E AcT OF 1936, § 117; I.T. R.Ev. Covi,
§ 117 (1939). Under the Revenue Act of 1939, § 117, three holding periods are recg-
nized. Gain or loss from securities held less than 1 months is taxable or deductible on
the total amount of gain or loss realized, but "short term loss shall be allowved only to
the extent of short term capital gain." Corresponding gain or loss from securities held
more than 18 months but less than 24 and from securities held more than 24 months is
taxable or deductible on the basis of 66,c and 50%, respectively, but in no case can
such tax on net long term capital gain exceed 30%'c of the amount of taxable gain. In
the case of net short term capital loss a partial tax is first computed upon net income
increased by the amount of the net long term capital loss, at the rate applicable to ordi-
nary income, and the total tax shall be the partial tax minus 3U, of the net long term
capital loss.
4. The term "holding period" is used throughout this Note in order to eliminate
recurring reference to specific acts. However, it must be realized that the earlier acts
recognized no such "holding periods" as do the recent ones. According to the earlier
acts, security transactions resulted in capital gain or ordinary income depending on
whether they had been held more than, or less than, two years. Recent acts have, on the
other hand, taxed all gains and losses on securities as ordinary income but have com-
pensated for long term holdings by recognizing several holding periods. Under the 1933
Revenue Act where three such periods are defined, long term gains are taxable at a
rate not to exceed 30% of the total ta-mble gain realized. Actually then, long term gain
is at present taxed not more than a flat 15, of the total gain realized. It therefore ap-
pears that the present capital gains tax is very similar to the original flat 121?% rate,
and it seems that no reason remains to attempt to distinguish the two types of acts.
5. IxT. Rrv. CODE § 62 (1939).
6. It has been said that the Treasury regulations [in ra note 8] create a presump-
tion that shares of stock sold from an unidentifiable lot were the first acquired and that
the burden rests upon the taxpayer to show the identity of the stock sold. Where the
shares sold are capable of being identified by certificate number as having been pur-
chased at a certain time and at a certain price, the courts have ruled that the shares rep-
resented by certificate delivered are to be considered as the shares sold. Foley v. Comm'r,
94 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938). See also Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935).
7. Even where the shares are not identifiable by certificate, if the shareholder mani-
fests to his broker an unambiguous intention to sell shares purchased at a certain price
and on a certain date, the shares so designated will be considered to be the ones sold.
Vawter v. Comm'r, 83 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). But a request to one's broher
to sell shares costing the most is ineffective as a designation when the proper certificates
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specific securities to be sold. Frequently, however, the taxpayer, by failing
to keep proper records or by neglecting at the appropriate time to identify
or designate, loses his privilege of self-selection. When the taxpayer is thus
disabled, the Treasury regulations establish a presumption that the taxpayer
has sold those shares first acquired - the "first-in, first-out" rule.8 But where
shares are commingled in corporate reorganization, the inconvenience 10 of
applying the identification and "first-in, first-out" rules has prompted a
notable exception :11 shares received in reorganization must be averaged over
the total cost of the old shares exchanged in determining the cost basis of
the new shares sold after the reorganization. 12 Although this exception solves
the problem of the calculation of the cost basis, it leaves unsettled the selection
of the applicable holding period. The perplexity of the Treasury Department
and the taxpayer, when confronted with the problem of applying the proper
holding period to hopelessly commingled shares, is graphically illustrated by
a recent case before the Board of Tax Appeals.' 3
were not delivered. Davidson v. Comm'r, 94 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), aff'd, 305
U. S. 44 (1938) ; (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 932; (1939) 37 "Mici. L. REv. 503. Intent
alone will not suffice but must be accompanied by some unequivocal manifestation. Hor-
ner v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
8. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 22(a)8: "If shares of stock in a corporation are
sold from lots purchased at different dates or at different prices and the identity of the
lots cannot be determined, the stock sold shall be charged against the earliest purchaser
of such stock." This regulation with but minor changes in wording has existed since
1917. U. S. Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 4, 60.
9. Although the cases in which the identity of shares has been held to be lost upon
reorganization deal almost exclusively with statutory tax-free reorganizations, there
appears no reason for so limiting this rule. Recently the rule has been extended to a sale
of corporate assets. Wesley Terhune, 40 B. T. A. 749 (1939). The rule is realistically
reasoned upon the fact that shares when exchanged in reorganization go into a "hodge-
podge" during which time even the transfer agent is unable to determine the identity of
the respective shares, and that when the new shares are issued, they are exchanged not for
a certain certificate evidencing a certain number of old shares, but rather for the indi-
vidual's shareholdings in general.
10. Upon reorganization the taxpayer's total shareholdings are simultaneously ex-
changed for new shares. Consequently, these new shares are not acquired "at different
times and at different prices" but at the same time and for identical consideration, and
therefore, the "first-in, first-out" rule does not appear applicable to shares acquired in
reorganization. Raoul Fleischmann, 40 B. T. A. 671 (1939) (discussing cases cited
infra note 11).
11. Comm'r v. Bolender, 82 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Comm'r v. Oliver,
78 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Comm'r v. Von Gunten, 76 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A.
6th, 1935). Helvering v. Stifel, 75 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) ; Henry Hudson,
39 B. T. A. 1075 (1939) ; Harry Runkle, 39 B. T. A. 458 (1939).
12. This exception is not found in the Treasury regulations themselves, but rather in
court and Board of Tax Appeals opinions. Comm'r v. Bolender, 82 F. (2d) 591 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1936); Comm'r v. Von Gunten, 76 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Wesley
Terhune, 40 B. T. A. 749 (1939); Raoul v. Fleischmann, 40 B. T. A. 671 (1939). How
the Treasury Department regards this exception is not clear, inasmuch as the Depart-
ment's repeated non-acquiescence to the average cost rule of the Von Gunten case has
just recently been reversed. 1939-I Cumf. Buu.. 36; non-acquiescence XII-2 Cum. BULL.
27 (1933) withdrawn. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 113(a) (12)-1.
13. William E. Mitchell, 40 B. T. A. 424 (1939).
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There the taxpayer in 1924, pursuant to a reorganization, exchanged his
shares of one corporation for those of a second. Subsequently these holdings
were increased by stock dividends and purchases of additional shares of the
second corporation. In 1929, pursuant to a second reorganization, the tax-
payer exchanged his total holdings in the second corporation for shares and
warrants of a third corporation. During the years 1929 and 1930, numerous
shares of both the second and third corporations were sold by the taxpayer
in many separate lots, all at a gain. In determining the amount of taxable
gain realized, the taxpayer who alleged ignorance of the "first-in, first-out"
rule, attempted to match each share sold with a particular purchase, choosing
always the highest-priced shares. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
on the other hand, applied the "first-in, first-out" rule to all but the few
shares properly identified, and concluded that the taxpayer's income, as
reported in 1929 and 1930, was greatly understated. The Board of Tax
Appeals approved the Commissioner's application of the "first-in, first-out"
rule to the shares sold prior to the second reorganization, 14 but with respect
to the shares sold thereafter, held that by applying the "first-in, first-out"
rule and by failing to utilize the rule of averaging which is appropriate when
there is a reorganization, the Commissioner had overstated the taxpayer's
taxable gain.' 5
The holding of the Board that the taxpayer erred in attempting to match
hopelessly unidentifiable shares with particular purchases was completely in
line with authority. 10 An unambiguous designation 17 to sell certain shares,
communicated to one's broker, absent a reorganization, is the only means
whereby unidentifiable shares may escape the application of the "first-in,
first-out" rule. Orthodox also was the Board's repudiation of the "first-in,
first-out" rule for sales of shares acquired after the second reorganization,
and its use instead of the average cost rule.18 But the Board failed to state1"
whether the gain so realized was taxable as long or short term, depending,
under the applicable revenue act,20 on whether the shares had been held more
than, or less than, two years. Certainly the Board did not mean to run the
holding period from the date on which the shares were exchanged, inasmuch
14. Id. at 450.
15. Id. at 451.
16. As to shares sold before reorganization: Snyder v. Comm'r, 295 U. S. 134
(1934) ; Homer v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934). As to shares sold after
reorganization; Comm'r v. Bolender, 82 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Conm'r v.
Von Gunten, 76 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
17. The present rule seems to be most concisely expressed by Member Murdock,
dissenting in Uzal H. McCarter, 34 B. T. A. 535, 540 (1936): ". . . where there is
no designation and no other means of identification, the Commissioner applies the first
in, first out rule; in cases where there is identification by certificates, he uses that means
of identification; and, finally, in cases where there is identification by designation of
shares otherwise not identifiable, then that method of identification must be used."
18. See note 11 supra.
19. It is difficult to determine from the Board's opinion just why the holding period
was not computed. Perhaps determination of the holding period was either unimportant
or had been previously stipulated by the parties.
20. REvENuE Acr OF 1928, § 101.
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as the "relation-back" rule in the statute unequivocally stated that "in de-
termining the period for which the taxpayer has held stock or securities
received upon a distribution . ., there shall be included the period for which
he held the stock or securities in the distributing corporation prior to the
receipt of the stock or securities upon such distribution."' 2' Since the shares
exchanged had been held by the taxpayer for periods varying from a few
weeks to many years, under the "relation-back" rule the new shares consti-
tuted both long and short term holdings. Yet neither judicial opinion, Board
of Tax Appeals decisions, Treasury Regulations, nor General Counsel's
Memoranda suggest a way to adapt the holding period principle to shares
hopelessly merged through reorganization.
22
The riddle left unanswered by the Board has several possible solutions.
Symmetrical with the use of the average cost basis would be the use of an
average holding period. 23 If the resultant average was more than two years,
then the total gain would be treated as long term even though some shares
had been held for only a few weeks. Use of the average holding period
method is, however, unwarranted. By recognizing but one holding period,
such a method not only seems to contradict the express design of the appli-
cable statute, which provides for two periods, 24 but is subject to possible tax
evasion. In those instances where a greater deduction is desired by the
taxpayer, who intends to liquidate long term security holdings, the increased
deduction could be obtained by purchasing additional shares sufficient to
raise the average holding period of the securities sold from long to short
term. The average holding period method is further unwarranted, since in
computing the average, the time multiple applied to those securities held
for a long term is disproportionately greater than that applied to those held
for a short period. Hence the tendency of the average holding period method
would be to make capital gains predominately long term.2 5
As a second possible method of determining the holding period, the Board
might have applied to the average cost basis a "first-in, first-out" rule. Thus
21. REvENUE Acr OF 1928, § 101 (c) (8) (C). The corresponding section of the pres-
ent Revenue Act likewise runs the holding period from the date of acquiring the original
stock. ITNT. REv. CODE § 117(h) (2) (1939).
22. Only recently has the holding period problem under the average cost basis rule
been recognized. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX HANDBOOK (1938) 135. In addi-
tion, the Board of Tax Appeals, recognizing the importance of determining the holding
period when securities are averaged in reorganization, has recently urged the Treasury
Department to provide a solution. Jacob Epstein, 36 B. T. A. 109 (1937).
23. According to the average holding period method, all the new shares sold would
be presumed to have been held for a period equivalent to the sum reached by adding to
the time elapsed between the reorganization and the sale, the quotient obtained after
multiplying the total number of shares in each lot by the days, months and years which
said shares were held (that is, up to the time of the reorganization), adding the result-
ing products and dividing by the total number of old shares.
24. REVENUE AcT OF 1928, § 101.
25. Where the taxpayer holds several lots of the same class of stock, some of these
lots will usually have been held considerable lengths of time. Under the average holding
period method, 100 shares held for four years has equal weight in the average as 800
shares held for six months.
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the shares of new stock first sold would be deemed to have been held for
the same length of time that the equivalent number of old shares first pur-
chased would have been held, had there been no reorganization. The fla, in
this procedure is, however, apparent. Since the gain or loss realized from
each sale is a product of commingled long and short term holdings, it is
unreasonable to treat gains from early sales exclusively as long term holdings,
and from later sales, as exclusively short term holdings.
Most effective as a solution to the enigma is the adoption of a proportionate
holding period. According to this method a percentage of the total gain or
loss resulting from securities sold after reorganization is allocated to each
holding period-which must of course relate back to the date at which the
old shares were acquired-in the proportion that the number of shares held
for each period bears to the total shareholdings. An example will clarify this
method of calculation. A case might arise where A purchased 200 shares
of X stock in 1934 at $25 per share, 100 shares in April, 1937 at $29 per
share and 300 shares in December, 1938 at $35 per share. In January, 1939,
pursuant to a reorganization, A exchanged his 600 shares of X stock for
1200 shares of Y stock, the average cost being $15 per Y share. Later in
January, 1939, he sold 200 shares of Y stock at $18 per share, thereby
realizing a gain of $3 per share or a total of $600. Of the 1200 shares of
Y stock, 400 shares (% of the total), 200 shares (% of the total) and 600
shares (, of the total) must under the statute "relate-back" to the dates
of acquisition of the 200, 100 and 300 shares of X stock, respectively. Ac-
cording to the Revenue Act of 1939, A's total holdings were thus composed
of shares which fall into each of the three holding periods. In determining
the gain on the 200 shares sold, %, %, 3 of the gain would be apportioned
to each respective holding period and taxed accordingly. -0 By contrast to
the average and "first-in, first-out" holding period methods, the proportionate
holding period rule would seem to furnish the fairest and most symmetrical
result for both Government and taxpayer, inasmuch as it recognizes that the
gain or loss has been computed from the average of many shares held varying
lengths of times, and accordingly, distributes that gain or loss, not to an
arbitrary "first-in, first-out" period, but to the varying periods from which
the securities were probably sold.
The reasonable result obtained in reorganization cases by employing a
proportionate holding period with an average cost basis suggests that this
method might well be carried over to all security transactions even where a
reorganization is absent and the shares are identifiable. The methods now
employed, the identification and "first-in, first-out" rules, are susceptible of
severe criticism, both ideological and practical.2 7 Realistically, the taxpayer's
26. The amount of taxable gain would thus be:
1 ($600 x 50%) = $100.00
i/ ($600 x 662%) = 66.67
IA. ($600x 100%) = 300.00
,q66.67
27. The present rules ignore not only brokerage practices [Millilan v. Comm'r, 83
F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); John Snyder, 20 B. T. A. 778 (1930)], but also the
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total interest in a corporation, as evidenced by shares of stock of the same
class, might well be viewed as a lump holding. There exists, therefore, no
compelling reason for adherence to the present rule permitting identification
of particular shares.2 8 Practically, application of this rule has resulted in a
mad scramble on the part of taxpayers to earmark particular securities and
to indicate, as sold, certificates evidencing the highest cost purchases, 20 thus
reporting minimum gains and maximum deductible losses. Since the process
of identification is so unfavorable to it, the Government, on the other hand,
has closely examined the circumstances surrounding each such attempt in
an endeavor to show that the certificates so used evidenced unidentifiable
shares and that therefore the "first-in, first-out" rule should be applied.30
The consequence has been a flood of needless litigation. 31 Ironically also,
the identification rule favors the wealthy taxpayer who is generally the bene-
ficiary of legal advice and is more often able to assert his privilege of self-
selection.
Even an abandonment of the identification rule in favor of the "first-in,
first-out" rule would not lead to satisfactory results. Particularly distressing
to the Government has been the fact that the "first-in, first-out" rule, which
worked so favorably for it in the rising markets of the 'Twenties, now results,
and in all probability will continue to result for some time, in a paucity or
a reduction of revenues. In the erratic present-day security markets, more
often than not the earliest purchased shares will not have been priced below
the later purchased ones, and the difference in the cost bases between the
earlier and later purchases, when the former actually cost less than the latter,
will not be sufficient to compensate for the 50 per cent basis on which long
term gains are at present taxable. Continued insistence, therefore, tinder
this rule that the shares first purchased be deemed to be those first sold,
combined with the inevitability of fluctuations in the business cycle, will
further accentuate the already uneven flow of Governmental receipts.
All these disadvantages of the identification and "first-in, first-out" rules
could be obviated by adopting the suggested average cost basis and the pro-
portionate holding period rule. Simple of administration, such a rule realisti-
actual workings of most marginal accounts. Frequently it is the last margin purchase
which embarrasses taxpayer and causes him to sell. Thus it would appear more realistic
to govern marginal transactions, which furnish about 50% of the cases in this field, by
a last-in, first-out rule. Cf. Robert Bingham, 27 B. T. A. 186 (1932) (short sales are
subject to a last-in, first-out rule).
28. Although identification of shares by certificate is permitted in order to enhance
negotiability [UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr § 1] and in order to provide a situs for
tax jurisdiction [De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1919)], the stock certificate has
usually been considered merely evidence of ownership in an undivided interest in the
concern as a whole. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365 (1908).
29. On the other hand, a taxpayer with large short term capital losses would prob-
ably desire to indicate as sold low cost securities so as to realize short term capital gains
against which to offset short term capital losses.
30. See William E. Mitchell, 40 B. T. A. 424, 455 (1939) (concurring opinion)
(pointing out the faults in the "first-in, first-out" rule).
31. Since 1934 litigation on these issues has resulted in 3 Supreme Court cases, 23
circuit court cases, 5 district court cases and 41 Board of Tax Appeal cases.
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cally rejards the sale of a portion of total security holdings not as an isolated
incident, but, rather, as the liquidation of a cross-section of a lump holding.
By eliminating the taxpayer's opportunity to identify or otherwise to desig-
nate high- or low-cost securities as the portion sold from among the many
held, and by establishing a more stable cost basis, the suggested rule should
result in a greater regularity of Governmental revenues.
As against these advantages of the average cost basis and the proportionate
holding period rule, it might be alleged, in order to discourage its appli-
cation to shares other than those exchanged in reorganization, that such a
rule is overly susceptible of tax evasion. Inasmuch as the number of shares
to be averaged in the case of ordinarily commingled groups of securities is
not limited, as in the reorganization situations, to those procured in reor-
ganization, nothing prevents the purchase for immediate sale of additional
shares by the taxpayer.32 Thus a taxpayer who intends to establish a deductible
loss by selling shares all of which represent long term holdings could by pur-
chasing additional shares and immediately selling all shares, both original
and newly acquired, raise the proportion of short term holdings, and could
thereby report on the same amount of actual loss a greater deduction than
had he not bought and immediately sold such additional shares.Z3 However,
this increased deduction benefits the taxpayer only when it can be offset by
short term capital gain. And were this apparent method of tax evasion to
become rife, it could easily be remedied by enacting a regulation excluding
from the proportionate holding period rule all purchases made within the
three months next preceding any sale of the same class of stock.3
It would seem therefore, that an attempt should be made to supplant the
identification and "first-in, first-out" rules by a formula, applicable to all
securities, which contains an average cost basis and a proportionate holding
period. But just how to accomplish this end is doubtful,3 5 inasmuch as the
32. There is no opportunity for tax evasion in the case where the taxpayer intends to
sell long term security holdings for a gain. The taxpayer is not benefited by purchasing
additional shares at the market in order to reduce the average gain per share, since such
reduction is compensated by the fact that the taxpayer at the same time, by increasing
the number of shares with a short term holding period, must thereby report a larger
proportion of his gain as current and 100% taxable.
33. In addition, if the taxpayer buys and immediately sells additional shares, equal
in number to the amount of his original holdings, he could, vw hile still retaining his orig-
inal position, report a deductible loss almost equivalent to that dhiich he could have
reported had he merely sold his original shares without making the additionil purchase.
34. Congress has eliminated a similar type of tax evasion by means of the "vash
sale" provisions in the latest revenue act. INT. REv. CovE § 118 (193)).
35. Judicial authority, repudiating the use of the average cost basis under all cir-
cumstances, is wholly dicta. See Kraus v. Comn'r, "S F. (2d) 616. 618 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) ; Skinner v. Eaton, 45 F. (2d) 568, 570 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). See also KLEIN, FED-
ERAL INco!-E TAxATION (1929) 346; (1932) 6 ST. Jonx's L. REV. 416. 417. Neverthe-
less, although an average has been used to arrive at a cost basis for stock subscription
rights, 'Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247 (192 ): Ayer v. Blair, 25 F.
(2d) 534 (App. D. C. 1928), and for shares acquired in reorganization [see cases cited
note 11 supra], the courts have been hesitant to extend the averaging rule to such
closely analogous situations as stock split-ups. Kraus v. Comm'r, supra. This hesitancy
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Treasury regulations prescribing the "first-in, first-out" rule not only have
repeatedly been held by the courts to be reasonable interpretations of the
statute,3 6 but by successive reenactments, without substantial change, of
sections of the revenue acts pertinent to these regulations, are now deemed
to have the force of law.3 7 However, the Treasury Department's power to
promulgate regulations overruling previous regulations which have the effect
of law has recently been upheld.3 8 Nor should the prohibition of retroactive
application of revised regulations"1 hinder the adoption of the suggested rule.
It would appear that the sale, and not the purchase, of securities is the trans-
action against which the bar of retroactivity is directed, and that therefore
the average cost and proportionate holding period could be adopted for all
sales consummated after the suggested revision has been promulgated.
FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMBINED ANNUITY
AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS*
THE development of a business institution conceived as.a device for tax
avoidance is illustrated by the growth of the combination annuity and life
insurance policy.1 According to the terms of a typical policy, the insurance
company agrees, in return for a single lump sum payment, to pay an annual
amount to the insured for the duration of his life and on his death to pay
the amount of the original premium to his named beneficiary. 2 The policy
contains the usual provisions for cash surrender value, loans and the change
of beneficiaries, but no physical examination is required for its issuance. The
seems to stem not from any fundamental hostility to a rule such as the one suggested,
but rather, from a constraint to follow the already existing Treasury regulations pre-
scribing the identification and "first-in, first-out" rules. See Member Murdock, concurring
in William E. Mitchell, 40 B. T. A. 424, 455 (1939).
36. Comm'r v. Merchants' & Mfrs'. Fire Ins. Co., 72 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 3d,
1934) ; Snyder v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
37. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939).
38. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939).
39. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939).
* Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047 (1939).
1. For a general discussion of insurance used for tax avoidance, see PAUL, STUDIES
IN FEDMAL TAXATION (1937) 25, 41; Bassett, Transfer of Property Through Trusts or
Insurance as Avoiding Federal Estate Tax (1936) 4 KA,. CITY L. REv. 90; Paul, Life
Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1074.
2. If the original premium was $42,000, the death benefit would be $40,000. The
variation is caused by the insurance company's deduction of a "loading" charge to cover
agents' commissions and other administrative expenses. This deduction is common to all
of the policies in the cases considered and will be disregarded in their consideration. See
Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047, 1059 (1939) ; Bowman v. Tax Comm., 135
Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916, 917 (1939).
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purchaser thus receives what is in effect a life annuity and a paid-up life
insurance policy.3
Although this division of the combination policy into two features may
appear innocent enough to the uninitiated, the federal taxing authorities
objected to the dichotomy when such a policy was presented, for purposes of
the estate tax, in the Old Colony case.4 There the executors of the insured's
estate had claimed that the money received by beneficiaries under the insur-
ance feature came within Section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which
exempted $40,000 of the insurance proceeds received by beneficiaries of the
insured other than his estate.5 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued,
however, that the two features of the combination agreement should be con-
strued together, 6 since, by their combination in one contract, the insurance
company's risk of loss for one item offset that for the other: if the purchaser
died before the expiration of his life expectancy, the company lost on the
insurance, but it made a corresponding gain through the termination of the
annuity. So construed, he contended, the agreement was not a contract of
insurance because the element necessary for insurance - distribution of risk
-- was absent.7 He concluded that the proceeds received under it were not
insurance proceeds and, therefore, that an exemption applicable only to
insurance was not properly taken. This view was accepted by the Board of
Tax Appeals s and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.9 The court found that the contract was in the nature of an "invest-
3. For discussion of the difference between annuities and life insurance, in whidch
their tax differences are emphasized, see Cohen, .4nnities and Transfer Taxes (1933) 7
J. B. A. KAN. 139; (1939) 26 VA. L. REv. 230. The annuity treated here is to be dis-
tinguished from annuities arising under life insurance policies wvherein the death benefit
is paid out in annuity form.
4. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 102 F. (2d) 3S0 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939), aff'g,
37 B. T. A. 435 (1938). Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 535 (1933) raised a
similar question and was decided on the authority of the Old Colony case.
5. INT. REv. CODE § 811(g) (1939). "The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including "(g) . . .,the amount receivable by the e.'ecutor as
insurance ...and ...the amount receivable (in eacess of $40,000) by all other bene-
ficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
6. Even though the purchase price is divided betveen the annuity and insurance
features on the basis of actuarial eaperience. Thu.. where the policy holder is 53 years
old, about 60% of the purchase price goes to the insurance and 40% to the annuity,
whereas in the case of an older purchaser the same company allocated 85% to the insur-
ance and 15% to the annuity. See Bowman v. Tax Comm., 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E.
(2d) 916, 917 (1939) ; Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936).
7. In Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936) the requirement of the
risk element was, likewise, stressed. In VANtm, INsuaRx. , (2d ed. 1930) g§ 3, 23, the
contract of insurance is defined largely in terms of "risk" which is designated as one of
the essential elements of an insurance contract. The Internal Revenue counsel conceded
that the combination contract involved the assumption by the insurance company of some
risk but this risk wvas not of an insurance nature; rather, it was an investment ris!:--that
incident to the management and investment of the insured's funds.
8. Old Colony Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 435 (1938).
9. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 102 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939), 52
HAzy. L. Ray. 1180; see Comment (1940) 38 MxicH. L Rav. 526.
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ment"' 0 with the insurance company from which the owner received a speci-
fied yearly income and, according to the terms of which, his beneficiaries
received the "invested" principal if the owner had not previously claimed it
by the surrender of his policy.
The recent decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in the Keller case1 l shortly
dispelled any complacency that the tax authorities may have derived from the
Old Colony victory, for the Keller decision disregarded the Commissioner's
contention that the old device had reappeared in a more subtle form. 12 In
that case, the decedent, aged 75, had entered into two separate contracts, one
a single premium life insurance policy and the other a single premium annuity,
each on the standard form used by the company in writing the respective
policies. Although the premiums on each were independently figured at stand-
ard rates, the risk attached to the insurance of one of her age would have
precluded the insured from buying the insurance policy unless she also pur-
chased the annuity. 13 The same issue of the insurance exemption provided
in Section 302(g) was again before the Board. The Board, stressing the
independent nature of the contracts and distinguishing the earlier cases in
which combination contracts were involved,'1 4 held that the two policies should
be treated separately for taxation purposes.
The validity of the Board's distinction might not be questioned if the only
situation involved were the $40,000 exemption from the federal estate tax.
Since persons with sufficient resources to afford paid-up policies would
normally be able to purchase additional insurance of the exempt type, it is
probable that the insurance exemption would be used to its full extent even
if it did not apply to the policies of the Keller type. But aside from this
exemption, the Board's determination of the nature of the policies has serious
implications in other tax connections.
10. "Investment" is used in this connection in the colloquial sense according to which
usage stocks and bonds are termed "investments" while insurance is not so regarded.
Functionally, life insurance in contrast with indemnity insurance is a form of investment.
See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 26, 47, 75, 80. Although the terminology may thus
be inapt, the distinction is nevertheless a valid one. The exemption provided by § 302(g)
specifically applies to "insurance" and it is appropriate that the exemption be denied to
other modes of saving, here termed "investments", if they do not have the essential ele-
ments of insurance.
11. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047/(1939).
12. The combination type of policy, never very prominent, has been largely super-
seded by policies of the Keller type. Clark, Taxation of Insurance Policies and Trusts
(1939) 4 JOHN MARSHALL L. Q. 445.
13. Persons over 70 or 75 are generally considered "uninsurable" and may purchase
life insurance only in connection with a group plan or coupled with an annuity policy.
Since there are few customers in the higher age groups, these provisions are made to
enable the insurance companies to "hedge" their risks. But in annuities and group in-
surance the premiums are figured on the basis of the same mortality tables used in deter-
mining the rates for insurance policies which are independently purchased. See Estate
of Anna M. Keller, 39 B.T.A. 1047, 1050 (1939).
14. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 102 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939); Chem-
ical Bank & Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938) ; In re Thornton's Estate, 186 Minn. 351,
243 N. W. 389 (1932); Ballou v. Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936).
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The Keller decision revives, in effect, a onetime favorite device for suc-
cession tax reduction. Until recently it was possible to avoid the federal
estate tax by setting up an irrevocable trust with the reservation to the settlor
of a life income from the trust property.15 Since it was held that the irre-
vocable transfer of the trust property took the conveyance out of the testa-
mentary class covered by the estate tax, even though the transferor received
all of the benefits from the property until his death,10 such transfers could
be reached only by the gift tax,' 7 which is 25% lower than the estate tax.28
But an amendment to Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act put an end to this
profitable use of the irrevocable trust by including wvithin the estate tax
"transfers by trust or otherwise . . .under which the transferor has retained
. . . income from the property."' 19 Under the Keller holding, however, it
is now possible, by the joint purchase of separate insurance and annuity
policies, to achieve a result similar to that once accomplished by means of
the irrevocable trust.2 0 The annuity policy provides its holder with a life
income; the irrevocable inter vivos assignment of the paid-up insurance
policy, with no benefits or incidents of ownership retained by the grantor,
takes the conveyance out of the ambit of Section 302(c) as presently con-
strued.21 On the other hand, if the two policies were held to be inseparable,
their procurement would be regarded as an "investment."- 2 The holder's
irrevocable transfer of the "insurance" rights could not then prevent the
imposition of the estate tax on the benefit payable at his death,2 since the
yearly return to the investor would clearly identify the transaction as a
15. See Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal Income
and Estate Taxes (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 587, 607; (1930) 44 H-rm'. L REv. 131.
16. 'May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
17. The gift tax supplements the estate tax. Where a gift tax is paid on a transfer
which is subsequently held testamentary, a credit for the gift tax payment is allowed on
the estate tax. See IxT. REv. CODE § 813(a) (2) (1939) ; Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r,
308 U. S. 39, 42, 45 (1939).
18. Tax savings in addition to the lower rate may be effected by tie use of the gift
tax. See 'MONTGOMERY AND .fAGILL, FEDERAL TAXES O- ESTATES, Tnlsrs, A-:n GirFTs,
1936-1937 (1936) 387 et seq.; (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 126.
19. IxT. Rnv. CODE § 811(c) (1939). See Surrey and Aronson, Inter ivz'os Trans-
fers and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1332, 1341 et seq.
20. Comment (1937) 32 ILL. L. REv. 223.
21. The transfer inter .ivos of life insurance is subject to the gift tax. I-T. REv.
CODE § 1000 (1939). Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (CL Cl. 1939) threw slime
doubt upon the tax status of such transfers. See (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 126. On rehear-
ing, the opinion was modified, so that it now holds that the irrevocable assignment of
life insurance on which the donor does not continue to pay premiums is not subject t), the
estate tax. Bailey v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1930). 1 fortiori, the ir-
revocable assignment inter vivos of a policy on which no more premiums were due would
not come within the estate tax.
22. See notes 8, 9 and 10 supra.
23. Although there are other ways in addition to that suggested by the Keller case
in which to accomplish the purposes previously attained by the use of the irrevoznble
trust, these methods are not efficient. See In re Honeyman's Estate, 93 X. J. Eq. oS3,
129 At. 393 (1925) ; Cohen, Annuities and Transfer Taxes (1938) 7 J. B. A. KANa. 139,
146 et seq.
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"transfer . . . under which . . . the transferor . . . retained . . . the
income . ."24
The decision that an annuity and a life insurance policy purchased jointly
are not an "investment" also makes possible the purchaser's reduction of
his income tax. Two cases in state courts 25 and a recent Memorandum of
the General Counsel of the Internal Revenue Bureau 20 indicate the form
that such tax avoidance will take. The holder of the annuity and insurance
policies will claim that his annual returns are received under an annuity policy,
and, as annuities, represent a receipt of principal as well as interest.27 -1e
will then argue that the income tax on such payments should be determined
in accordance with Section 22(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code,2 8 the
statutory provision applicable to annuities, which taxes only so much of an
annuity as represents a return of interest.29 The greater portion of each pay-
ment will thus be free from the income tax in most cases. 30 For example,
assuming $12,000 is paid for an annuity which returns $1,200 yearly, and
$30,000 is paid for a life insurance policy with a $40,000 death benefit, income
tax under the Keller rule would be paid only on $360 (3% - the statutory
figure- of $12,000). If, however, the two policies were considered as a
unit, the entire return of $1,200 would represent income on a $40,000 "invest-
ment" and would therefore be taxable.
In light of the important differences for tax purposes between the com-
bination contract of the Old Colony case and the two contracts involved in
the Keller case, the basis for the Board's distinction between the two trans-
actions cannot be disregarded. The Board purports to find an "entirely
24. INT. Ray. CODE § 811(c) (1939). Cf. Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 (1930),
in which the Court held that a fixed annual payment was taxable as an annuity where
the payment was a charge upon both the income and corpus of a testamentary trust.
That case is clearly distinguishable from the yearly payment on the "investment," for,
by contract, the payment is a return on the investment and in no way diminishes the
principal sum returnable at death or on the exercise of the surrender privilege.
25. Bowman v. Tax Comm., 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939) ; Ballou v.
Fisher, 154 Ore. 548, 61 P. (2d) 423 (1936).
26. Gen. Counsel Memo. 21716 (1940), revoking Gen. Counsel Memo. 6395, VIII-
1 Cu-m. BuLL. 67 (1929). 4 Prentice-Hall 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 66,068.
27. See Comment (1937) 11 TEmP. L. Q. 567, 568.
28. INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (2) (1939). "Amounts received . . . under an annuity
contract shall be included in gross income, except that there shall be excluded from gross
income the excess . . .over an amount equal to three per centum of the aggregate pre-
mium . . . paid for such annuity (until the aggregate amount excluded for premiums
. equals the aggregate premium)."
29. The statutory provision thus recognizes that annuity payments represent a return
of principal with interest. The apparently arbitrary figure of 3% of the aggregate pre-
mium was established as the taxable return because of the belief that at least that much
of the return represented interest and was taxable as income. It has been suggested
that the tax is, in effect, a 6% tax, because it is figured on the basis of the original pre-
mium payment, part of which is consumed each year. See Comment (1937) 11 TM.a,
L. Q. 567.
30. If the annuitant should live beyond his life expectancy, so that the aggregate
amount paid in annuities less the amount taxed each year equalled the original cost of




different situation" in the Keller case but, on analysis, its reasoning appears
to consist solely of reiteration that a "plain annuity" and a "plain, ordinary
policy of insurance" are different from a "life annuity with principal sum
payable at death." 31 Aside from separability, there was only one factual
difference between the contracts in the Kcllcr case and that in the Old Colony
case :32 while the particular annuity policy which the decedent Keller purchased
for herself was not surrenderable either independently or in conjunction
with the insurance policy, the surrender privilege of the combination policy
in the Old Colony' case included the annuity feature along with its life insur-
ance feature. Because of the relative unimportance of the surrenderability of
the annuity, this difference is hardly a sufficient reason to distinguish between
the policies in the two cases. Since the purpose of the transaction in either
scheme is the reduction of estate taxes, the policies are usually bought by
persons with short life expectancies whose life insurance rates are high and
whose annuity rates are correspondingly low. The annuity policy is therefore
secondary in value to the surrenderable insurance policy. Furthermore, the
buyer probably does not consider the surrender feature of the contracts of
consequence, inasmuch as the exercise of this privilege involves the loss of
a portion of the purchase price in the form of "loading charges."03 But if
the annuitant should wish to liquidate his nonsurrenderable annuity policy,
he could probably sell his rights under the annuity contract for an amount
approximating that part of the surrender value of the combination policy
allocable to its annuity feature.3 4 Thus, it is apparent that, as between the
parties, the difference in the transactions was wholly formal and had no real
functional or commercial significance.3r
A possible explanation for the Keller decision may have been a belief by
the Board that the transaction before it involved neither subterfuge nor the
invention of a new tax evasion device, but rather tax avoidance through the
orthodox use of traditional forms.30 Under such circumstances, a decision by
31. Apparently in an effort to support its unconvincing distinction of the Old Colony
case on purely formal grounds, the majority opinion makes an attempt to show the inde-
pendence and "risky" nature of the annuity policy by pointing out that if the annuitant
should outlive her life expectancy, as did her grandmother, the insurance company would
lose on the annuity because of the extended period of the annuity payments. Estate of
Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T.A. 1047, 1057 (1939). Actually, the length of the holder's life
is a matter of indifference to the insurer because the gain or loss under one policy is
counterbalanced by a corresponding loss or gain on the other.
32. One writer, after successfully isolating five additional, but formal, points of dif-
ference brought out in the Keller decision, suggests that they are all either immaterial
or not distinctive. Comment (1940) 40 COL. L. R"Ev. S 87.
33. See note 2 supra. The possibility of the "loading" charge loss acting as a deter-
rent should not be minimized. Although it has been represented as 5% of the total pre-
mium in most of the cases discussed, it has tended to rise, so that now 10% is the usual
charge- See Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39 B. T. A. 1047, 1051 (1939).
34. In the absence of a contract provision to the contrary, the annuitant's rights
could be assigned. REsTAXTMENT, CoxNMA'crs (1932) §§ 150, 155.
35. If the Keller decision is followed there seems to be no reason why a preient
holder of the type of policy involved in the Old Colony case could not exchange it for
policies of the Keller type and thus benefit by its tax advantages.
36. Tax statutes are supposedly drafted in terms of specific forms or objects and
may be said to be limited to such objects in their application. See Reinecke v. Northern
1940]
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the Board of Tax Appeals which leaves the question open for legislative
solution was to be expected.3 7 Further probing of the implications of the
Keller case, however, uncovers a more deep-seated explanation for the de-
cision. Profiting by the example of the Ohio Supreme Court in a recent
case,38 it may have considered analogous situations before making its decision.
The Board's reluctance to hold the annuity and life insurance policies a unit
would then be understandable, even if unjustified. Such a decision would
bring before it a multitude of cases involving situations similar in principle
but assuming an infinite variety of forms. If the two policies in question
were to be considered as one, what of the case where two such policies are
taken out in different companies? What if they were taken out at different
times or if the annuity and life insurance were in proportions which did not
readily lend themselves to the investment analogy? How to be treated are
the great variety of annuities that an owner of life insurance might purchase?
In this explanation of the Board's decision there is a warning to the legis-
lative or judicial body which undertakes to solve this problem.30 If the
solution is to be effective, it must take into account methods of tax avoidance
analogous to that presented by the Keller case. The effect of purchasing the
two policies in separate companies or at separate times is the same as buying
them in the same company or in the same contract, since in all cases the
premiums on each policy are figured independently and the fundamental
relation between the two is unvaried. The annuity is always the reverse of
life insurance. 40 Economically one counteracts and nullifies the other. The
neutralizing effect of an annuity on a life insurance policy is thus not restricted
to the case where the two are sold jointly; it is a phenomenon arising out
of the mechanical workings of each of them whenever they are placed i'n
juxtaposition.
BRUCE H. GRE mnLDt
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 348 (1928) ; PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) 29;
ef. Pearson v. McGraw, 60 Sup. Ct. 211 (U. S. 1939) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L.
WEEK 192 (U. S. 1940).
37. An eminent tax authority has pointed out the desirability of leaving questions
beyond the convenient flexibility of statutes for legislative solution. See Paul, Life In-
surance and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HAizv. L. REv. 1037, 1074 et seq.
38. Bowman v. Tax Comm., 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N. E. (2d) 916 (1939). This case
had a combination policy similar to that in the Old Colony, Ballot and, Thornton cases,
note 14 supra, but the Ohio court, deciding against the weight of those cases, reached
a decision like that reached in the Keller case where separate policies were involved.
One of the principal reasons given by the court for its decision was that the combination
policy was similar in operation to separate annuity and insurance policies and the court
would have held such policies taxable separately.
39. There will be ample opportunity for judicial attacks on this problem, since the
Keller case and two others similar have been appealed. Estate of Anna M. Keller, 39
B. T. A. 1047 (1939) (on appeal to C. C. A. 3d) ; Estate of Cecile Le Gierse, 39 B. T. A.
1134 (1939) (on appeal to C. C. A. 2d); Estate of Herbert F. Tyler, B, T. A. memo
op., I Prentice-Hall 1939 Fed. Tax. Serv. 6.504 (on appeal to C. C. A. 8th).
40. See Carroll v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 9 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W. D.
Mo. 1934) ; Comment (1937) 11 TEMP. L. Q. 567, 568.
" Second Year Class, Yale Law School.
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LABOR BOARD REINSTATEMENT OF EMPLOYEES OBTAINING
SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT EMPLOYMENT*
AN important power of the Labor Board is derived from Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act' whereby the Board is authorized to
S.. take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . .
Pursuant to this provision, the Board has ordered the reinstatement of former
employees who have obtained substantially equivalent employment,3 not-
withstanding the fact that an employee is defined in Section 2(3) to include
"... any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained . . .substantially equivalent employment . . ."4
In support of this position, the Board has maintained that its reinstatement
authority is not limited to the statutory rubric of "employees" within Section
2(3) ; and, further, that even if Section 2(3) does apply, workers who were
"employees" at the date of the unfair labor practice may be ordered rein-
stated although they subsequently secure equivalent employment. But when-
ever challenged in the courts, these orders have been set aside on the ground
that they had been issued without statutory authorization.5 In spite of its
continued failure to obtain judicial approval, the Board's most recent decision
on this issue again ordered reinstatement of workers who had secured sub-
stantially equivalent employment elsewhere.
6  t?
The interpretation put upon the Act by the courts produces undesirable
consequences. An individual who has ceased work because of a labor dispute
or unfair labor practice, or who has been unlawfully discharged, will refrain
from soliciting other employment in order to ensure the protection afforded
*Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 5 LAB. RF. REP. index p. 283 (1939).
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
2. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1938).
3. During the early administration of the Act, the Board ordered reinstatement of
only those employees who had no equivalent work. N. L. R. B. v. Millfay Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 97 F. (2d) 1009 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938), aff'., 2 N. LIR.B. 919 (1937) ; Rabhor Co.,
Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 470 (1936). Because of the uncertainty of its present stand, the
Board now decides whether or not a worker has received equivalent employment, but
states that it does not concede a finding of no equivalent work is essential for reinstate-
ment. See, e.g., Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 13 N. L R. B. 338 (1939);
Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 54, Oct. 26, 1939.
4. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152(3) (Supp. 1938).
5. N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939);
Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 193,), on reheiar-
ing. 97 F. (2d) 959 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 133 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (193S), enforcement of supplemental order
granted. 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 193S), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 646 (1939). A
decision in the Second Circuit on a different issue indicates that a like treatment avaits
such an order if squarely presented. See N. L. R. B. v. National Casket Co., 5 Ln. Ra.
REP. index p. 437 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), L. Hand, J., dissenting.
6. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 5 LAB. R _. REP. index p. 283 (1939).
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by the statute.7 His period of idleness will thus be prolonged and the employer
who has violated the Act will be required to bear an increased burden of
back pay.8 In addition to needless hardship on employer and employee, the
interpretation permits a circumvention of statutory objectives. Experience
has shown that employers frequently discriminate against union leaders in
their employ in the attempt to cripple a labor organization. 9 Under the courts'
decisions, this discrimination may proceed with impunity, despite the union's
loss of essential membership, if the worker, driven by economic necessity, 10
seeks and finds equivalent employment. Such results can hardly be said to
promote industrial peace or to prevent employers from profiting by unfair
labor practices.1 1
A practical objection to this judicial qualification of the Board's authority
is revealed by an appraisal of the consequences attached to the definition
of "substantially equivalent employment." In defining the term the Board
gives greater weight to the desire of the employee to return to familiar sur-
roundings than to the fact that his new position pays higher wages.'- If
longer commuting is required,' 3 if seniority rights are sacrificed' 4 and if the
new position does not assure continued employment,'0 there is no substantially
7. Since a back pay order is not a private right of the employee but is issued in the
public interest, an employee has no obligation to mitigate the amount of back pay by so-
liciting other employment. See Agwilines, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 87 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936), N. L. R, B., 4TH ANN. REP. 100 (1940) ; (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265, 1267.
The Act has been criticized for permitting an employee to "sleep on his rights." Hearings
before Committee on Education and Labor o) S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 155o, S. 158o, and S.
2123, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), as reported in 4 LAB. REL. REP, index p. 593 (1939).
8. For an analysis of how back pay orders are computed, see (1939) 48 YALE L. J.
1265.
9. See, e.g., Planters Mfg. Co., 10 N. L. R. B. 735 (1938) ; Precisions Castings Co.,
8 N. L. R. B. 879 (1938).
10. There is a long period of uncertainty during which the status of an employee,
whose employer is charged with violating the Act, is undetermined. The disposition of
1,353 cases through Dec. 31, 1938, filed by the AFL and CIO shows that the combined
average of all cases took 293 days from the original charge to the final decision. RroarT
OF THE NLRB To SEN. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR (1939) 4 LAD. REL. REP. index p.
247. An amendment proposed by the AFL would reduce this period to four months and
ten days. See (1939) 4 LAB. REL. RE'. index p. 460.
11. Equivalent employment does not serve the Act's purpose since its objectives are
preventative and not simply to remunerate employees. SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 1, 6; H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 9; Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 335 (1938) ; see Comment (1938) 26 CALiF. L. REv. 354.
12. Planters Mfg. Co., 10 N. L. R. B. 735 (1938); Tiny Town Togs, 7 N. L. R. B.
54 (1938); Kelley-Springfield Tire Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 325 (1938); but see N. L. R. B.
v. Botony Worsted Mills, Inc., 4 LAB. REL. REP. index p. 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), where
the court refused to sustain a finding based only on the employee's preference. See (1939)
52 HARV. L. REV. 1365.
13. Boss Mfg. Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 432 (1939); Kuehne Mfg. Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 304
(1938).
14. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 16 N. L. R. B. No. 54, Oct. 26, 1937.
15. Pulaski Veneer Corp.. 10 N. L. R. B. 136 (1938).
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equivalent employment. It is evident that the Board's strict evaluation of
the new employment means that a slight variation will preclude a finding in
the majority of cases that the subsequent work is a substantial equivalent
of the previous position. This determination is a question of fact within
the discretion of the Board,'0 and, if supported by substantial evidence, is
conclusive.. 7 It is questionable policy for the courts to establish a rule of
law which the Board can effectively and lawfully avoid, through the use of
its fact finding power, by proceeding to find no substantially equivalent em-
ployment. A realistic approach by the courts would be to recognize that
their present limitations on the Board's authority do little more than add
another step to the administrative investigation of the "employee's" status.
The Board's construction of Section 2(3) avoids these unfortunate results
and is more consonant with the policies of the Act. Under its interpretation,
"'equivalent employment" envisages a condition at the date of the unfair labor
practice and, therefore, this time is the dividing line that determines when
equivalent employment will destroy the worker's standing as an "emplovee."
No consideration of other employment thus is necessary when the employer-
employee relationship exists either at the time of a discriminatory discharge,
or when employees leave work because of unfair labor practices. In these
cases, of course, workers would be "employees" at the time of the unfair
labor practice. The equivalent employment provision would be relevant only
when employees are already on strike because of a labor dispute. In this
situation, the time of the employer's unlawful conduct would be decisive. If
a worker, idle because of a labor dispute, accepted an equivalent position,
he would be ineligible for reinstatement, although subsequently during the
course of the strike the employer committed an unfair labor practice.1 8 But
those securing employment after the discriminatory act would not be barred
from relief.19 This interpretation appears to be warranted because, if Section
2(3) is held to apply, its ambiguities- created by the lack of any indication
of the time other employment might bar reinstatement -0 - should be resolved
16. Mooresville Cotton 'Mills v. N. L. R. B.. 97 F. (2d) 959 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
17. See N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.. 30'i U. S. 2.92, 259
(1939) ; Consolidated Edison v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (193S ).
18. A prerequisite to reinstatement is an unfair labor practice by the employer. N. L
R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.. 304 U. S. 333, 345, 346 (1938) ; Black Diamond S. S.
Corp., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d. 1938). cert. denicd. 304 U. S. 579 (193S). Employees
on strike (caused by no unfair labor practice) cannot be reinstated after tle employer
has resumed normal operations. N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping C,.,
306 U. S. 292 (1939). See N. L. R. B.. 3n ANN. Rur. 199-204 (09391.
19. Since an employer may unlawfully prolong a strike that %.as originally due to a
labor dispute and not to any unfair labor practice, the Board has ordered reinstatement
following the employer's unlawful conduct during the strike. X. L. R. B. v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 2d. 1938), cert. denial, 304 U. S. 570 (l938). re-
hearing denied, 304 U. S. 590 (1938). See N. L. R. B., 4rM A..'. REP'. 104. 105 194IJ .
20. Other employment might be obtained after the unfair labor practice but e6ore
either the charge, the complaint, the hearing before the trial examiner, the hearing ltfore
the Board, the Board's order, or the final decree of th. ce.urt. See RtVLrq mnt REiCL,-
TIOS FOR N. L. R. B., Art. II; 1939 Wis. L. REv. 445, 453.
1940]
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in a manner that will protect all workers subjected to an unfair labor prac-
tice.
21
An obstacle to the Board's flexible interpretation of Section 2(3) lies
in the fact that, for purposes other than reinstatement and back pay, workers
securing equivalent employment after an unfair labor practice would not be
subject to the Act.2 2 Influenced perhaps by this inconsistency, the circuit
court in Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board,2 3 stated
that the section was unambiguous, and that "employees" were disqualified
whenever equivalent work was accepted. This decision, if followed, would
result in overwhelming complexities, because a continuous surveillance of the
status of "employees" would be required until the time of reinstatement
ordered by the Board and, if the order were challenged, until there had been
a final adjudication in the courts. Decisions of the Supreme Court granting
reinstatement long after the date of the unfair labor practice, without remand-
ing the case for further investigation,2 4 signify that this interpretation is
not correct. The point of view expressed in the Carlisle Lumber case,2 5 that
"employees" were disqualified if they had secured other employment at the
time of the Board's order, is likewise objectionable because it prolongs the
period of uncertainty during which employees will refrain from soliciting
other employment; and individuals who are employees at the time of the
unfair labor practice, but accept a position prior to the order, will be denied
the remedies furnished by the Act.
In addition to the reasons previously stated, further considerations indicate
that, regardless of the proper construction of Section 2(3), the Board's
affirmative authority should not be restricted to "employees." 2 , Authority
21. Ambiguous statutes should be interpreted to facilitate their obvious aims. Royal
Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 165, 169 (1933); Wilbur
v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U. S. 206. 219 (1930) ; Work v. United States ex
reL Rives, 267 U. S. 175, 177 (1925). True collective bargaining requires that all work-
ers be protected from discrimination. See SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1935) ; Hart and Prichard, The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1275; Nathan-
son and Lyons, Judicial Review of the National Labor Relations Board (1939) 33 ILL.
L. REv. 749.
22. See notes 33, 34 and 35 infra.
23. 94 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), on rehearing, 97 F. (2d) 959 (1938).
24. See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938). Like-
wise, a controversy was not rendered moot because the employer subsequently complied
with the Act. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261 (1938).
25. 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938). enforce-
vient of suppleinental order granted, 99 F. (2d) 533 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 646
(1939).
26. The Supreme Court has not passed on the precise issue involved when strangers
are compelled to enter an employer-employee relationship. Although a laborer who se-
cured equivalent employment may not be an "employee" within Section 2(3), he is surely
not a stranger to his previous employer. But if he is considered to be a stranger, author-
ity for his reinstatement may be drawn from other decisions of the Court on analogous
issues. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600
(1914) (enjoined a conspiracy under the Sherman Act from refraining to contract);
New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917) (compulsory workmen's coin-
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for back pay is expressly given only in Section 10(c), where it is coupled
with reinstatement orders. If reinstatement is restricted to "employees," it
follows that back pay is likewise so restricted. This, in fact, has been the
position of the Ninth Circuit.27 But Congress certainly did not intend to
deprive an "employee" of the back pay necessary to recompense him for
injuries incurred prior to obtaining an equivalent position.2 3 Recognizing
this segment of legislative intent, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed an order of back pay to workers who had accepted equivalent em-
ployment, but set aside the order of reinstatement on the ground that the
workers were no longer "employees." 2  Since the court felt justified in
awarding back pay to those whom it did not consider "employees," no reason
appears why there was not equal justification for the same conclusion as to
reinstatement. A restriction of the scope of affirmative orders to "empluyees"
would also impair the provision in Section 8(3)0 which declares that it
shall be unlawful to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ-
ization by discrimination in regard to hire. One who is only seeking employ-
ment is obviously not an "employee." Hence an individual who is denied
employment because of union affiliations would be without an effective
remedy.3 1
Since it appears unlikely that Congress intended to emasculate these pro-
visions by limiting their application to "employees" as defined in Section
2(3) ,32 the present judicial construction appears untenable. The definition
pensation contracts); Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 23b (U. S. 1$71) (implied contract
for compensation of first pilot tendering his services to an incoming vessel$ ; (1939) 53
HA.v. L. RE. 141; cf. (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 667. See note 31 infra.
27. N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937 1, cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938), enforcement of supplemenlal order grantcd, 59 F. (2d) 533
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied. 306 U. S. 646 (1939) ; N. L R. B. v. National Motir
Bearing Co., 105 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). But see where the same circuit
awarded back pay to the estate of an employee who died subsequent to the date of the
Board's order. N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications, 102 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
28. SE . REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1Q35) 23, 24. One off the olijectives
of the Act is to restore the status quo, and this will not obtain if an employee must ar
the burden of an unfair labor practice. See Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. X. L R.
B., 94 F. (2d) 875, 879 (C. C. A. 2d. 1938). cert. denied. 304 U. S. 579 (1938) ; N. L. R.
B. v. Remington Rand, Inc.. 94 F. (2d) 862, 872 (C. C. A. 2d, 192&), cert. denied, 304
U. S. 576 (1938).
29. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) do1 (C. C. A. 4th. 193S), on
rehearing. 97 F. (2d) 959 (1938). See (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 125, 1269.
30. 49 STaT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 1583) (Supp. 1038).
31. In one instance the Board ordered an employer to hire individuals vhw had nevcr
previously been in his employ. Waumbic Mills. Inc., 15 X. L. R. B. No. 4, Sept. 1, 1939.
See (1939) 53 HARM. L. REv. 141. This remedy was clearly contemplated by Congress.
See H. R. REP. 'No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 19. The only analogous jutlicial
decision on this question set aside the Board's order to hire former employees (la, fully
discharged prior to the effective date of the Act) whom the employer discriminatorily
refused to employ. N. L. R. B. v. National Casket Co., 5 LAn. RLt_ REP. index p. 437
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939), L. Hand, J., dissenting.
32. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. (2d) 713, 72- (C. C. A. 3d, 1939);
N. L. R. B. v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 18, 23 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
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of an "employee" in Section 2(3) is essential for a practical administration
of other sections: to determine with whom the employer must bargain col-
lectively;33 to ascertain those persons whose rights to self-organization are
protected from interference by the employer ;34 and to delimit the class of
individuals who are entitled to vote in an election or otherwise participate
in the designation of representativesY.r The definition is not indispensable,
however, for a determination of how the objectives of the Act may be achieved
under Section 10(c). An adventitious comparison of prior and subsequent
employment can have little bearing on the question whether reinstatement
of certain employees would fortify industrial peace. To secure complete con-
sistency of purpose between all sections of the statute, the specific provision
- "including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay" - should
be construed as words of illustration rather than limitation of the general
grant of power to take affirmative action.30 In the Fansteel case, the Supreme
Court avoided a direct decision on this question of construction." Since the
issue before the court was more readily determinable if the words were con-
strued as those of limitation, there is some indication that the court does not
so interpret the statute. Any permissible inferences from the Fansteel decision
are augmented by previous cases where the court has upheld affirmative orders
not expressly mentioned in Section 10(c), such as posting of notices 8 and
disestablishment of employer-dominated labor organizations.3 0 It appears,
therefore, that the most satisfactory construction of the Act is to grant the
Board the discretionary power to reinstate workers even though they may
no longer be "employees" and regardless of whether they have obtained sub-
stantially equivalent employment elsewhere.
33. When workers have received equivalent work they cannot be considered when
deciding whether an employer has refused to bargain collectively with a majority of his
"employees." Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938).
34. See N. L. R. B., 4TH ANx. REP. 64-69 (1940).
35. See id. at 73-82.
36. The expressio unius maxim is useful only to discover intent and falls when a
contrary policy is shown. See Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U. S. 121, 125 n. (1934) ;
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 206 (1928) : but see Missouri v, Ross, 299
U. S. 72, 76 (1936) ; D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208 (1932).
37. The basis of the Court's decision was that the reinstatement ordered by the Board
would not effectuate the policies of the Act. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U. S. 240, 258 (1939). Mr. Justice Stone, concurring, stated directly that workers
who were not "employees" within Section 2(3) could not be reinstated. Id. at 263. The
lower court's position was similar to Justice Stone's. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v.
N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 375, 382 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
38. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261 (1938); N. L. R.
B., 4TH A N. REP. 109 (1940).
39. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261 (1938); N. L. R.




JUDGMENT ON MERITS AS RES JUDICATA OF JURISDICTION
OVER SUBJECT MATTER*
THE doctrine that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit is void and subject to collateral attack in
any court at any time1 has long obstructed nationwide administration of
judgments. This rule, a result of a conception of jurisdiction as a power to
adjudicate bestowed upon a court from a sovereign source,2 has conflicted
with the practical need that judgments be made conclusive.3 To preserve
the legend of jurisdictional vulnerability while giving at the same time fixity
to judgments, courts have devised such legalistic dodges as presumptions
of regularity,4 estoppels 5 and classes of inviolable quasi-jurisdictional facts.6
No theory was effective, however, in making judgments unassailable -par-
ticularly in foreign courts- until the concept of res judicata 7 was introduced
into the field of subject matter jurisdiction by the United States Supreme
Court, the tribunal most interested in making judgments conclusive through-
*Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 60 Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S. 1940).
1. 1 FREEmAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 668; 1 BaILEy, JurasDic'mo:z (1S99) 136.
2. See United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 709 (U. S. 1832); Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 718 (U. S. 138) ; 1 B.*,ux-, Jur IsDIeTio:N (1899) 2.
3. The perpetual vulnerability of judgments on jurisdictional grounds made judg-
ment titles unmarketable, gave no effect to rights acquired in reliance upon judicial
records and permitted parties to relitigate the same issues interminably. Reexamination
of jurisdictional questions in foreign states or in federal courts tripled a party's oppor-
tunities to upset an unfavorable decision. See diagrams in Anxom -.D JM1 oEs, CsS
ox TRais, JUDGMENTS AND Av..s*,LS (1936) 134-35.
4. A judgment fair on its face is presumed to be valid and conclusive as to the
regularity of all steps necessary in acquiring jurisdiction. Applegate v. Lexingtin &
Carter County Mining Co., 117 U. S. 255 (1886); (1936) 46 Y.ALE L. J. 159, 160. The
presumption has been extended to validate a judgment showing lack of jurisdiction on
its face. Des Moines Navigation & Ry. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552 (1837).
But this presumption has never been applied to judgments of sister states. I Fn --FaA,
JuDmxTrs (5th ed. 1925) 781.
5. The doctrine of estoppel forbids attack upon invaid divorce decrees by spoues
who participated in or relied upon the decree. Langewald Y. Langemald, 234 Mass. 269,
125 N. E. 566 (1920); REsTATEmwT, Co.LicT oF LAws (1934) § 112; 3 Foml-x,
JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 2962.
6. "Quasi-jurisdictional facts" are those facts, such as the situs of matrimonial
domicil, diversity of citizenship, or amount in controversy, which form the basis for
the conclusions of law as to jurisdiction. Since they are not strictly jurisdictional, they
are impregnable against collateral attack. See Noble v. Union R. L. R. R., 147 U. S.
165, 173 (1893).
7. Res judicata, originally a simple rule of convenience preventing a party from
burdening the courts with the same matter more than once, had been crystallized by
nineteenth century judges and glossators into a congeries of formal rules and maxims
centering about the doctrines: (1) that in a new suit between the -came parties on a
different cause of action, the prior judgment is conclusive upon all points passed upon
by the court, (estoppel by verdict), and (2) that in a new suit between the same parties
on the same cause of action, the prior judgment is conclusive upon all points which might
there have been raised (estoppel by judgment). See Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U. S. 351,
352-353 (1876).
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out the nation. The federal courts had earlier applied res judicata to personal
jurisdiction in cases giving conclusive effect to rulings made upon special
appearance,8 on the rationale that a party who came in and litigated the issue
of personal jurisdiction impliedly agreed to be bound by a decision, though
erroneous.0 The obstacle of supposed unwaivability which had prevented the
extension of res judicata to subject matter jurisdiction was first prominently10
spanned in American Surety Company v. Baldwin," followed by Stoll v.
Gottlieb12 - cases in which the original court had made a specific though
incorrect finding of its own power to judge. The "jurisdictional bootstrap"
argument- that a jurisdictionless court could not clothe itself with power
by making a finding that it possessed jurisdiction -was rejected in favor
of the view that an express finding of jurisdiction, like any- other judicial
act, should be given the effect of res judicata.13 The power concept of juris-
diction was forced to yield before the practical need for terminating litigation.
In terms of fairness to individual litigants, however, the application of
res judicata to the question of jurisdiction could hardly have been termed
successful. Clumsy wielding of the strict and formal rules of res judicata
supplied new evils to replace those of jurisdictional vulnerability. The first
prominent application of the doctrine, in American Surety Company v. Bald-
win, gave conclusive effect to an ex parte judgment rendered without hearing
against a surety on a bond on which it was in no way liable.14 Rigid appli-
cation of the rule flouted legislative policy and aided in the perpetuation of
wrong decisions.'5
A new approach to jurisdictional res judicata is heralded by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxtcr State
Bank.'0 Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act of 193417 empowered federal
district courts to sanction municipal debt readjustments. The defendant Chicot
district, complying strictly with the terms of Chapter IX, entered into an
arrangement whereby its outstanding bonds were exchanged for new securi-
8. Comment (1940) 53 HARv. L. REV. 652, 656.
9. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522, 525 (1931).
10. A few early decisions applied res judicata to subject matter jurisdiction in
special situations. Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 (1894) (diversity of citizenship)
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506 (1897) (jurisdiction of original court upheld on
appeal); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 (1926) (intrastate com-
merce).
11. 287 U. S. 156 (1932), (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 427.
12. 305 U. S. 165 (1938), (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 879, 39 COL. L. Rav. 274.
13. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172 (1938). The Court refused to decide
whether land and status cases were included in the rule of jurisdictional res judicata,
but other recent cases point to universal application of the rule. Davis v. Davis, 305
U. S. 32 (1938) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 60 Sup. Ct. 317
(U. S. 1940). But cf. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 60 Sup. Ct. 343 (U. S. 1940).
14. See 287 U. S. 156, 159-61 (1932); Baldwin v. Anderson, 50 Idaho 606, 621,
299 Pac. 341, 346 (1931).
15. E!g., Reid v. Independent Union, 200 Minn. 599; 275 N. W. 300 (1937) ; Treinles
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66 (1939).
16. 60 Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S. 1940).
17. 48 STAT. 798 (1934) ; 11 U. S. C. § 301 (1934).
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ties on the basis of thirty-six cents on the dollar, and a scheme of refinancing
executed through the RFC. Plaintiff bondholders were admittedly given full
notice of the plan but they neither exchanged their bonds nor contested the
reorganization. Two months after the entry of the bankruptcy court's final
decree, Chapter IX was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.18 Plain-
tiffs later sued in the federal district court for the face value of their bonds.
The Chicot district's plea of the bankruptcy decree as res judicata was over-
ruled by the district court and by the circuit court of appeals1" on the ground
that a decree whose jurisdiction was founded upon an unconstitutional statute
was void and incapable of functioning as res judicata. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that plaintiffs were precluded from attacking the decree,
despite the later unconstitutionality of Chapter IX. Plaintiffs were bound
because they had not originally contested or appealed the question of the
court's jurisdiction although they had full notice and opportunity to do so,
because rights had vested in reliance upon the decree's validity, and because
all parties had treated the statute and decree as operative and binding facts.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion is remarkable for its quiet empirical tone,
eschewing the categorical approach of earlier courts to this problem in favor
of an examination into the practical difficulties involved in voiding the decree.
The case extends the union of res judicata and jurisdiction over the subject
matter to the situation where the issue of jurisdiction has neither been con-
tested nor expressly decided by the court.20 By thus making every judgment
where defendant has been given notice and has failed to contest jurisdiction
conclusive upon the question of the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter,21 the court has effectively disposed of the old saw that "jurisdiction
over the subject matter may not be waived." The case places the burden
upon the parties to raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction in the
original proceeding or be deemed to have waived the issue. In superseding
the requirement that the court make a formal finding of its jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court is giving effect to the necessary implication of each judgment
that the delivering court has the requisite power to adjudicate. It is also
properly emphasizing the fact that the decree was treated by the parties at
18. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 293 U. S. 513 (1936).
19. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 103 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939).
20. See also Vindholz v. Everett, 74 F. (2d) 834 (C. C.A. 4th, 1935) (federal
jurisdiction implied from ruling on merits).
21. The rule is not, however, without exception. Where an overriding policy demands
that a court yield its jurisdiction over a res to a superior tribunal with plenary juris-
diction over the subject matter, the proceedings of the first court will still be subject
to collateral attack. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 60 Sup. Ct. 343 (U. S. 1940) (filing of ban!-
ruptcy petition under Frazier-Lemke Act held automatically to oust jurisdiction of
state court over proceedings to foreclose mortgage on debtor's farm and to subject sale
and dispossession authorized by state court to collateral attack); cf. First Nat. Ban:
v. Robinson, 107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939). This approach seems proper wherever
public interest in limiting a court's jurisdiction overbalances the policy of terminating
litigation. Thus a court should not be permitted to give the effect of res judicata to a
labor injunction issued in violation of an anti-injunction statute. But cf. Reid v. Inde-
pendent Union, 200 Min. 599, 275 N. W. 300 (1937).
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the time as a binding and valid judgment rather than stressing the purely
formal fact of a recital of jurisdiction. In addition, it disposes of the para-
doxical result of the Baldwin rule in binding a party who objects to juris-
diction if the original trial and appellate courts disagree with him, but per-
mitting a party who voluntarily participates in the original proceeding later
to attack it.
The Chicot case is important also in marking the Supreme Court's express
repudiation of the theory than an unconstitutional statute is a nullity which
can confer no rights22 - a dogma which has been largely hacked away by
exception 23 and generally abandoned by state and lower federal courts.2"
By regarding the statute as an existing reality, as the parties at the time
regarded it, rather than with the hindsight language of "void ab initio," by
giving effect to the heavy investments made in reliance on the validity of
the statute and decree, and by requiring parties to raise the constitutional
issue or be regarded as having waived it, the court shows its understanding
that the question of unconstitutionality is a practical problem in political
administration which must be handled differently for each type of situation. 25
In addition, the case marks the application of the Sunburst case 20 doctrine -
that changes in the law will be given only prospective and not retrospective
effect when parties have made acquisitions on the strength of the existing
law -to the situation of a statute regarded as valid but later found uncon-
stitutional; another indication that the idea of "action in reliance" is obtaining
its deserved respect from the Court.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the decision lies in its replacing the
mechanical treatment of res judicata which has been evident in recent Supreme
22. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (1886) ; Security Say. Bank v. Connell,
198 Iowa 564, 200 N. W. 8 (1924). See Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559,
566 (1913); 1 BAILEY, JURSDIcTIoN (1899) 11.
23. The de facto doctrine has saved several decisions made by courts acting in excess
of their constitutional powers. Burt v. Winona & St. P. R. R., 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W.
285 (1884); FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935) 113-118.
Where parties have relied upon a statute's validity, the courts will protect them. Ross
& Co. v. Road Dist. No. 4, 27 F. (2d) 153 (E. D. Tex. 1928). Those who accept the
conditions of a statute are estopped from later attacking its unconstitutionality. Pierce
Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refining Co., 259 U. S. 125 (1922). A constitutional attack must
be raised in the trial court or be waived. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U. S. 77
(1927). But in criminal cases, a conviction under an unconstitutional statute may always
be attacked by habeas corpus. Ex pare Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Servonitz v.
State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277 (1907).
24. Woods Bros. Const. Co. v. Yankton County, 54 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931);
Herndon v. Moore, 18 S. C. 339 (1882); Beck v. State, 196 Wis. 242, 219 N. W. 197,
(1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 639 (1928) ; Jones v. McGrath, 160 Okl. 211, 16 P. (2d)
853 (1932).
25. Compare with the instant case's treatment of unconstitutionality, that of Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 60 Sup. Ct. 343 (U. S. 1940) discussed supra note 21, in which a state
foreclosure proceeding conflicting with the constitutional provision granting Congress
full power over bankruptcies was held void and not res judicata of state court's juris-
diction over subject matter. See also (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 373; (1929) 29 CoL.
L. REv. 1140.
26. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
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Court decisions 27 with a broad and sensible approach to the subject. In
determining that the issue of jurisdiction is res judicata because the plaintiff
could have raised it in the previous suit (and thus implying that the read-
justment proceeding and the present suit are the same cause of action), the
court bypasses without discussion such niceties as the fact that the present
suit is in personam while the bankruptcy arrangement was in ren, and other
distinctions which would show the two proceedings to be different causes
of action. This easy handling of the technical rules of res judicata shows a
proper treatment of the problem which should not be regarded as a system
of rigid formulae but as a simple canon assuring each litigant one full and
fair opportunity to present his arguments before a disinterested arbiter.29
A party who fails to seize this opportunity should not be permitted to raise
the issue later on the basis of some technical informality.
Other tribunals may, however, be less adept than the Supreme Court in
leaping doctrinal hurdles in the path of a fair result by the process of ignor-
ing them. The easiest method for achieving the desirable result of the Chicot
case in other courts with the tools now at hand, seems to be by giving the
widest possible scope to the idea of a cause of action, upon which res judicata
depends. In other connections, the Supreme Court has regarded a cause
of action broadly - as the aggregate of operative facts making up the original
transaction. 29  Such a workable interpretation of a cause of action would
permit flexible manipulation of res judicata. If the previous case was so
presented that there was a fair opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issue
now sought to be raised, res judicata should bar its further relitigation.
The Chicot decision also holds great potentialities for making judgments
conclusive in foreign forums. Although judges have emasculated the phrase
"full faith and credit" to permit foreign courts to attack any judgment on
jurisdictional grounds,3 0 the words "res judicata" still inspire respect. Res
judicata has already superseded inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction
between state and federal courts. 31 If the Court is consistent in applying
27. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 7 U. S. L. ,VWut 644
(U. S. 1939), opinion withdrawn, (1940) 8 U. S. L. W.rn 126 (state court's revievi,
of rate order, regarded at time as legislative review incapable of generating res judicata
and without right of appeal to United States Supreme Court on federal question, given
effect of res judicata by retroactive application of later state decision holding such review
to be judicial); Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932) ; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U. S. 66 (1939).
28. See 1 Mfooam, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 160; Von Moschzisker, Res Jvdicata
(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 300. The suggestion has been made that a judgment rendered
by a court without jurisdiction after a hearing be treated as a binding arbitration. Gavit,
Jurisdiction of the Subiect Matter and Rcs Judicata (1932) 80 U. or PAs. L. Rrv. 3.
29. United States v. 'Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 2,S U. S. 62 (1933 ); Hum Y. Oursler,
289 U. S. 238 (1933); see 1 MIooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE (1933) 145-159; CLax,, Cox:
PLEADI G (1928) 83.
30. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1850); Thompson v. WYhitman, 18
Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873).
31. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U. S. 165 (1938); cf. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) (Virginia decree given effect
of res judicata in District of Columbia court). State courts have made a few faltering
steps toward giving subject matter jurisdiction the effect of res judicata. Chamblin v.
1940]
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the Chicot doctrine 32 to require all courts to give full respect to each foreign
judgment on the ground that it includes an implied finding of res judicata
of jurisdictional issues, the prospects for national uniformity in treatment
of judgments are indeed auspicious.
INCOME TAX ON TESTATOR'S ESTATE AT DISTRIBUTION
OF GENERAL LEGACY*
As a rule, no income tax may be collected from a donor on a gratuitous
.transfer of property which has appreciated in value since its acquisition. The
theory advanced in justification of this result is that there has been no "real-
ization" of a capital gain within the Supreme Court's definition of "income." 1
An exception to this rule appears to have been formulated, however, in
William R. Kenan, Jr.,; a recent decision of the Board of Tax Appeals
involving the distribution of a legacy under a testamentary trust. In the
Kenan case, the trust instrument provided that a named beneficiary, upon
attaining the age of forty, should receive $5,000,000 or, at the option of the
trustees, marketable securities in that amount. Distribution was largely made
in securities which had increased in value nearly $2,000,000 since their
acquisition by the trust at the time of the testator's death. The Board con-
strued the distribution not as the transfer of a legacy, but as the discharge
of the trust's pecuniary obligation to satisfy the beneficiary's rights in the
trust fund.3 Hence the gain to the trust, resulting from the release of other
assets from this obligation to the extent that the distributed securities had
appreciated in value since the time of the testator's death, was taxable income
"realized" on a "sale or other disposition of property" within the meaning
Chamblin, 362 Ill. 588, 1 N. E. (2d) 73 (1936) ; In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N. J. Eq.
599, 180 Atl. 633 (1935).
32. The Court may not be willing to extend the Chicot rule to all cases. See Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 60 Sup. Ct. 343, 346 (U. S. 1940).
*William R. Kenan, Jr., 40 B. T. A. No. 124, Oct. 26, 1939.
1. The Supreme Court has defined "income" as a gain derived and "realized"
from property "provided it . . . include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920), following Seligman,
Are Stock Dividends Income? (1919) 9 AmER. EcoN. REv. 517. Thus, income is defined
in U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 111-1, as any gain "realized from the conversion of property
into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either
in kind or in extent."
2. 40 B. T. A. No. 124, Oct. 26, 1939, now on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. 404 C. C. H. TAX SERv. 9057, 9066 (1940).
3. Following Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd per curiam
sub norn. Suisman v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., Ex'r, 83 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 573 (1936), rehearing denied, 299 U. S. 621 (1936),
criticized in MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND Gxrrs (1938) 40.
Accord, I. T. 3316, INT. Rw¢. BuLL. No. 37 (1939) 6. But cf. 0. D. 667, 3 Cum. BULL.
52 (1920).
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of the Revenue Act.4 Thus a technique of circumventing general prohibitions
against taxing capital gains, which has been used to permit the taxation of
a corporation's repurchase of its own bonds at a discountu or of distribution
of appreciated assets to satisfy the declaration of a stock dividend, G has noiv
been introduced into the law governing the taxation of general legacies.
It is probable that a slight decrease in tax revenue will result from the
adoption of this technique of characterizing the distribution of appreciated
property in satisfaction of a general legacy as the discharge of a pecuniary
obligation. In the case of a specific bequest, title to which may be said to
have vested in the legatee at the time of the testator's death, 7 fair market
value of the property at the time of decedent's death is taken as the basis
for computing taxable gain on a subsequent realization by the legatee.8 In
4. RE xuE AcT oF 1934, § 111, 48 STAT. 703, 26 U. S. C. § 111 (1934). The cor-
responding provision in the Revenue Act of 1938 is identkal. 52 STAT. 484 (19338,
INT. R.v. CODE § 111 (1939).
5. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931). But cf. Transylvania
R. R. v. Comin'r, 99 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), (1939) 17 N. C. L REV. 305.
The principle that a corporation realizes taxable income from the discharge of an
indebtedness has now been enacted into law. Revenue Act of 1939, §215(a), I.-T. RM'.
CODE § 22(b) (9) (1939). Cf. Betty Rogers v. Comm'r, 103 F. (2d) 790 (C.C. A. 9t,
1939).
6. Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co., 20 B. T.A. 556 (1930). But cf. General Utilities
& Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935), criticized in IMAGILL, TA%,ELn.
IxcoMlE (1936) 233.
7. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 113(a) (5)-1; cf. Brewster v. Gage, 230 U. S.
327 (1930). The dissent in the Kenan case interpreted the legacy not as a pecuniary
bequest, but as one of money or securities in the alternative, which became a legacy (f
securities once the trustee exercised his option. Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D.
Conn. 1935), note 3 stipra, and United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931),
note 5 supra, were said to be distinguished by the fact that in the Kc:an case the consent
of the beneficiary was wholly immaterial in determining the form that the distribution
would take. William R. Kenan, Jr., 40 B. T. A. No. 124, at 5-6, Oct 26, 1939. The
majority indicated in reply that in the Kcnan case, as in the Suisnan case, there was no
bequest of specific securities since the beneficiary had an equitable right to receive $5,000,0D0
in cash or its equivalent but no right to any specific assets. Id. at 3.
8. 52 STAT. 490 (1938), INT. Rv. CODE § 113(a) (5) (1939). The phrase used to
describe the basis under the 1934 and subsequent Acts, "time of such acquisition" (i.e.,
by bequest, devise or inheritance), had proved so ambiguous when used in the earliest
income tax laws -see, for example, Roebling v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 444 (C. C.A. 3d,
1935) - that in § 113 of the 1928 and 1932 Acts, 45 STAT. 819 (1928), and 47 SToT. 159
(1932), Congress clearly distinguished between specific and general bequests, providing
that for the latter, the basis should be value at the date of distribution to the legatee,
and for the former, value at the date of the testator's death. However, Congress returned
to "time of such acquisition" in the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 705 (1934), perhaps
in reliance (see Elizabeth G. Augustus, 40 B. T. A. No. 17S, Dec. 20, 1939) on the
interpretation given the phrase by the Supreme Court, for the 1926 Act, in Brewster v.
Gage, 280 U. S. 327 (1930). "Time of such acquisition" is now being almost uniformly
interpreted as time of testator's death. Elizabeth G. Augustus, supra; U. S. Treas. Reg.
101, Art. 113 (a) (5)-1. This makes the apparent partial revival of the 192 classification
in the E ng case, note 10 infra, particularly conspicuous. But while under the 1928 basis
for property acquired by general legacy the capital increment beteen the date of the
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the absence of the Kenan rule, the same basis would be applied to general
legacies. 9 The result of taking this basis is that the tax burden for capital
appreciation between the time of the testator's death and the time of realiza-
tion on the property, including the appreciation arising while the property
is in the hands of the trustee, is borne by the legatee alone. But tinder the
Kenan doctrine, because of the "consideration" said to be supplied by the
beneficiary through the discharge of the trust's pecuniary obligation to him,
the beneficiary takes his share not as a legatee, but as a "purchaser." It is
therefore implied from that case, and has since been held by the Board, 10
that the basis for computing the taxable gain to the beneficiary on a subse-
quent sale of the property is value at the time of "purchase," that is, the date
of distribution by the executor or trustee. Thus the tax burden for the
appreciation from the time of the testator's death until ultimate sale by tile
beneficiary is divided between the trust and the beneficiary; and this division,
in view of the graduated rate of taxation provided under present tax laws,
will probably net a smaller tax than that which would result from taxing the
entire appreciation to one person.
The probable decrease in revenue, however, would seem to be no real
objection to the imposition of an income tax on decedents' estates at the
time of distribution of general legacies. Any necessary increase in revenue
should be achieved through adjustment of the rate of taxation. The alloca-
tion of taxes should be determined according to the equitable position of the
parties who will have to bear them.11 In the Kenan case, the tax burden
will ultimately fall on the remaindermen or residuary legatees. Since they
are the ones who will benefit from the capital gain which is the occasion for
the tax, such a result seems clearly equitable.
A complete statement of the principle of equitable allocation of tax burdens,
however, would require not only that capital gains be taxed to the person in
whose hands they arose, but also that no capital gain escape taxation. From
this point of view, both statute and the Kenan case's specific holding have
permitted an unjustified gap in leaving wholly free from income tax increases
in the value of property between the time of acquisition by the testator and
his death.1 2 If the donor avoids any "realization" by sale or exchange in
his lifetime, neither he nor his heirs or legatees need ever pay a tax on the
testator's death and the time of distribution was tax-free, that blind spot is now covered
by the rule of the Kenan case.
9. Different considerations may apply where the property distributed by the trustee
in satisfaction of a legacy has been acquired subsequent to the testator's death. Tile
Board suggested by way of dictum in the Kenan case that this eventuality was an
argument for taking value at the time of distribution, rather than time of death, as the
basis for computing gain on the legatee's realization on the property. William R. Kenan,
Jr., 40 B.T.A. No. 124, at 5, Oct. 26, 1939. But the circumstance of acquisition subsequent
to decedent's death may reasonably be interpreted to give rise to a separate category,
with value at the time of acquisition by the trustee as the basis. See Richard J. Reynolds,
41 B. T. A. No. 9, Jan. 10, 1940. The securities distributed in the Ewing case, note 10
infra, were all part of the original estate.
10. Sherman Ewing, 40 B. T. A. No. 138, Nov. 15, 1939.
11. See SIMONS, PERSONAL INcomE TAXATION (1938) 134-135.
12. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 162-1.
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appreciation of the property in the donor's hands.13  In the case of gifts
inter vivos, some compensation for the non-taxability to the donor of the
appreciation in value from time of acquisition to the time of gift has been
provided by the requirement that the donee take cost to the donor as the
basis in computing taxable gain on a subsequent sale of the donated prop-
erty.14 It has been suggested that cost to the testator should similarly be
made the basis for measuring taxable gain on the realization of property by
a legatee.' 5 This device, however, has proved to be neither fair nor wholly
effective. The equities would seem to dictate the imposition of a tax on
donors and on decedents for the appreciation in value of property in their
hands, rather than a later tax on that increment to be borne by the donees or
legatees. Further, from the point of view of revenue, the requirement that the
donee should take cost to donor as his basis has proved to be an inadequate
substitute for an income tax imposed directly on donors. It is now relatively
simple for the donor to escape to some extent the graduated rate of taxation
by delegating to others, by means of gratuitous transfers, the power of sale
and the concomitant liability to taxation - a liability at a lower rate than
would have been imposed on the donor, had he retained the property to
transact the sale himself.'0 A direct tax on donors would remove this power
completely.'
7
13. The estate and gift taxes are manifestly inadequate as compensations for the
non-taxability of capital gains on gratuitous transfers, partly because of the large
exemptions which they allow and partly because of their moderate rate of tax. See,
relative to the gift tax, IxT. REV. CODE §§ 1001(a) (schedule of rates), 1003(b) (annual
exemption of $4000), and 1004(a) (exemption of $40,000) (1939). On the estate tax,
see IxT. REv. CODE §§ 810 (schedule of rates), 812(a) (exemption of $100,000), and
826(c) (exemption of $40,000 on proceeds of insurance) (1939).
14. 52 STAT. 490 (1938), IxT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (2) (1939) ; Taft v. Bowers, 278
U. S. 470 (1929). Cf. Speer v. Duggan, 5 F. Supp. 7 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
15. TWENTIETH CENTuRY FUN XD. INC. FAcING THE TAx Pono -u (1937) 483, 491.
16. See Reginald Fincke, 39 B. T. A. No. 65. Mar. 3, 1939, where the Board,
acknowledging that "it is . . . clear that [the petitioner] sold the stock to the three
family trusts and his daughter at cost, having in mind that they in turn could sell the
stock at a profit," and that "the petitioner's testimony shows that he deliberately refrained
from selling this stock on the market, realizing a large profit himself and subjecting
himself to income tax on that profit," nevertheless held that the petitioner realized no
gain from the transaction. Cf. Janney v. Comm'r, 103 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939),
where it was held that the husband's losses could be used to offset his wife's gains,
on their joint income tax return. But see Pierce v. Comm'r, 100 F. (2d) 397 (C. C.A.
2d, 1938).
17. The Controller in New York once attempted to impose an income tax on
donors, on the theory that gifts were realizations of income comprehended within the
statutory phrase "other disposition of property" [cf. note 4 supra], but his statutory
construction was not accepted. Wilson v. Wendell, 196 App. Div. 596, 183 N. Y. Supp.
273 (3d Dep't 1921); Brewster v. Wendell, 196 App. Div. 613, 18 N. Y. Supp. 510
(3d Dep't 1921). The constitutional issue in the states is much less serious than that
encountered by Congress, since the states have only "equal protection" and no Sixteenth
Amendment with which to contend.
For suggestions on the treatment of capital losses, see Suso,.s, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 212.
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Such a direct tax, however, might be subject to constitutional attack on
the ground that a gratuitous transfer does not give rise to taxable "income"
under the Supreme Court's early and rigid definition of "income" as gain
severed from capital.18 One escape from this difficulty would be for the
court to discard its view that there is no income until realization. There
is nothing inevitable about the realization criterion. Four justices dissented
from the decision which established it, and many writers believe a truer
definition of income to be the net accretion to one's economic power between
two points of time. 19 Under this view, all capital gains, whether realized or
not, constitute income, and realization is no more than a convenient occasion
for a reckoning between an individual and the taxing authorities. 20 A
gratuitous transfer, no less than a sale, would seem to qualify as such an
occasion.21 However, it is quite possible that a tax on donors might be
sustained without departing from the formal realization criterion. Numerous
decisions have shown that the term "realization" is a very pliant one.
22 Of
course, if the holding of the Kenan case, that pecuniary bequests satisfied
in appreciated property are sufficiently unlike specific bequests to warrant
a significant differentiation in treatment for income tax purposes, is sound,
the case constitutes an orthodox application of the realization doctrine. But
if it is merely a colorable rationalization to justify imposition of an income
tax on what is really a gratuitous transfer, it is difficult to perceive why
a similar rationalization could not be extended to other sorts of gratuitous
transfers. On this view, the case may suggest a possible rationale for sus-
taining an income tax on donors on the gratuitous transfer of property which
has appreciated in value since its acquisition.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. HAIG, The Concept of Income in THE FEmDER. INcoAtr TAX (Col. Univ.
Lectures 1921) 7. Cf. REPORT OF SUBCOMIaTTEE OF COMMI11TTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
ON PROPOSED REVISION OF THE REVENUE LAWS, 75th Cong., 3d. Sess. (1938) 30: "From
the standpoint of taxation, the kind of income that is relevant and significant is the
income that measures taxpaying ability." See in general, Wueller, Concepts of Taxable
Income II: The American Contribution (1938) 53 PoL SCI. Q. 557.
20. SIMONS, op. cit. supra note 11, at 100. Cf. Powell, Income from Corporate
Dividends (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 363, 376.
21. While an income tax on annually accrued, unrealized gains and losses might
be cumbersome and inadvisable, SImoNs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 169, there would be
few, if any, novel difficulties encountered in collecting an income tax on gratuitous
transfers of property. Both the difficulty of valuation and the possibility of "forced
liquidation" to raise cash for payment of the tax are familiar under other sections of the
tax laws. See INT. REV. CODE § 113 (1939).
22. See MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 392 et seq.
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APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN
OF PROCEEDS OF LEASE CANCELLATION*
THE apportionment between life tenant and remainderman of proceeds
derived from the cancellation of a lease is governed by inconsistent legal
principles.' The receipt of such proceeds may result from a simple cancella-
tion or from a cancellation accompanied by the grant of a new lease of a
longer term. Although courts distinguish between the two situations, the
body of doctrine applied in both is scarcely satisfactory. The inadequacy of
the existing law controlling simple cancellations is graphically illustrated by
a recent New York case.
2
A testator created a trust, with income to his wife and children, remainder
to the issue of the children. The corpus was composed, in part, of certain
real property which the testator, five years before his death, had leased for
a term of twenty-one years. In the ninth year of the lease, the lessee, with
court approval, paid the trustee a lump sum for the surrender and cancella-
tion of the lease. The trustee then asked the Surrogate Court for instructions
as to the proper disposition of this sum. The life tenants contended that the
payment was income and should be immediately distributed as such, while
the remaindermen insisted that the proceeds should be allocated either entirely
or in part to the principal account. The court, however, chose a middle ground.
It directed the trustee to divide the sum into as many installments as there
were years remaining until the expiration date of the lease and to pay one
installment in each of these years as income from the trust.
3
The court was guided by precedent which seems to turn on whether or
not the person to whom the lessee delivered the money bore a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the remainderman. Where this relationship is discovered, the
court usually directs the payment of the sum in installments over the balance
of the cancelled lease; in the absence of such a connection, the entire sum
is awarded to the life tenant as immediate income.4
* In re O'Keeffe's Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
1. This Note is concerned only with the situation which arises when the settlor has
not defined the rights of the beneficiariks to the proceeds from cancellation of a lease
otherwise than providing that income from th t trust is payable to one beneficiary, and
the principal is payable to another beneficiary uprin the death of the first. Fur the situa-
tion where the testator provides otherwise, sce 2 Scor. TnusTs (1939) § 233.5.
2. In re O'Keeffe's Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (Surr. CL 1939), j1940) 24 li:n::.
L. REn 442.
3. Should the trust terminate before the expiration date of the kase, the unpaid
installments would become due and payable at unce to the remainderman.
4. The rule arose in the English courts. In In re Hunloke's Settled Estates, [1902]
I Ch. 941, 71 L. .. Ch. 530. a life tenant to whom a lessee had paid a settlement was
allowed to retain the sum as immediate income. Parker, J., in In re Rodes, [1909] 1 Ch.
815, 78 L. J. Ch. 434, a similar case, ordered an apportionment of the sum over the re-
mainder of the cancelled lease. He distinguished the previous case un the ground that
the life tenant in that case had not been a fiduciary, while, in the case before him, the life
tenant-payee was a fiduciary under the Settled Land Acts. 18112, 45 & 45 VICr., c. 33,
§ 53, and hence could not retain the sum. See WociF.LL. LaVLOn .V;D TE:.:Nr (Blun-
dell's ed. 1939) 35. Importance is attached to the absence of a fiduciary relationship be-
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In the light of this rule's shortcomings, the court must have set it tip to
justify rather than determine the conclusion. Since some fiduciary relation-
ship to the remainderman is implicit in the status of life tenant and trustee,5
the two possible payees, the establishment of a standard of "fiduciary rela-
tionship" without definitional qualification is of no help in solving the prob-
lem.6 And even if the standard were reduced to more workable terms, it
would still bear no logical connection with the question of who should be
the ultimate recipient of the money. 7
That so arbitrary a rule is not conducive to an equitable result seems
apparent from examination of the alternative dispositions which it leaves
available. Where cancellation is the sole consideration for the settlement,
neither disbursement to the life tenant as immediate income nor apportion-
ment over the remainder of the cancelled lease will fairly compensate the
beneficiaries for their respective losses.8 After cancellation the particular
property will, of course, produce no income until a new tenant is obtained.
Even thereafter, a partial loss of income owing to a reduced rental will
probably occur, for the willingness of the previous lessee to pay a large settle-
ment indicates that the cancelled lease demanded a rental considerably in
excess of the current lease-value of the property.9
Since it appears at first blush that both losses will fall on the life tenant,
payment of the entire settlement to him, as some cases suggest,10 might seem
fair. But actually, an immediate distribution of the entire sum to the life
tenant would be inequitable; the life tenant might die at once,11 and the
tween payee and remainderman in In re Penrhyn's Settlement, [1922] 1 Ch. 500, 91 L. J.
Ch. 490, and to its presence in the instant case, and, by implication, in Johnson v. Brink,
271 Mass. 521, 171 N. E. 717 (1930). See Note (1939) 121 A. L. R. 900. But see Lang
v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 343 Mo. 979, 124 S. W. (2d) 1198 (1938), which looks
to the relationship between life tenant and remainderman, rather than between payee and
remainderman; it stands as the only exception to a tenuous rule.
5. See Warfield v. Bixby, 51 F. (2d) 210, 214 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) ("The relation
of a life tenant to a remainderman . . . is that of a quasi-trustee.")
6. The payee who bears a "fiduciary relationship" to the remainderman cannot
treat the settlement as immediate income to the life tenant because to do so, it is rea-
soned, would be a breach of his fiduciary duty. See In re Rodes, [19091 1 Ch. 815, 818,
78 L. J. Ch. 434, 436. The rule fails to state which of the common fiduciary relationships
include the duty to apportion over the remainder of a cancelled lease.
7. The fundamental equities of the remainderman's claim to the settlement are
certainly not augmented by a delivery of the money to the trustee rather than to the
legal or equitable life tenant.
8. The settlement is most equitably distributed between life tenant and remainder-
man if it restores both beneficiaries to the positions they would have been in had not the
lease been cancelled; or, in other words, if it compensates each beneficiary for his losses.
9. The settlement does not necessarily prove a reduced rental; the lease might have
contained restrictions or other provisions which would seriously impair the rental value
of the property to the particular lessee, but which would not similarly impair its value
to another.
10. Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 343 Mo. 979, 124 S. W. (2d) 1198 (1938);
In re Hunloke's Settled Estates, [1902] 1 Ch. 941, 71 L. J. Ch. 530; I re Penrhyn's
Settlement, [1922] 1 Ch. 500, 91 L. J. Ch. 490.
11. If the life expectancy of the life tenant exceeds in years the unexpired term of
the lease, it is probable that he will suffer the entire loss. However, it is but a mere
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remainderman would not be indemnified for the unproductive period or the
period of reduced rentals occurring after the life tenant's death.12 The solu-
tion reached in this 13 and a few other cases'4-a distribution of the con-
sideration over the remainder of the cancelled lease-would compensate the
remainderman for any losses he might suffer, but it would deprive the life
tenant of an adequate income while a new tenant was being found.', The
greater brunt of the loss is thus placed upon the life estate despite his efforts
in negotiating a successful settlement. Hence neither of these dispositions
will reach a completely fair result.
The settlement could be distributed equitably, however, by providing from
it a reasonable income to the life tenant while the property remains unpro-
ductive, and then, when a new lessee is obtained, by apportioning the re-
mainder of the sum over the unexpired term of the cancelled lease.10 For
the proposed payments to the life tenant during the unproductive period, both
legal support and practical rules for administration may be found in the cases
and state statutes which supervise the apportionment of the proceeds of sales
of unproductive trust property.' 7 The states' rules vary as to the amount of
probability, and the settlement should not be given to the life tenant even in cases where,
as here, the life tenants are children and the lease, when cancelled, had but 12 years to run.
12. See it re O'Keeffe's Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201, 204 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
13. In re O'Keeffe's Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
14. In re Rodes, [1909] 1 Ch. 815, 78 L. J. Ch. 434; accord, Johnson v. Brinl:, 271
Mlass. 521, 171 N. E. 717 (1930).
15. In Johnson v. Brink, 271 'Mass. 521, 171 N. E. 717 (1930), the cancelled lease
was replaced at once by a new lease at a lower rental; the life tenant hence did not expe-
rience an unproductive period, and apportionment of the settlement over the remainder
of the cancelled lease was proper compensation for the reduced rental. In In re O'Keeffe's
Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201 (Surr. Ct. 1939) and In re Rodes, [1909] 1 Ch. 815, 73
L. J. Ch. 434, it is possible that the properties were leased immediately after the lease
cancellations, in which case the apportionments ordered would be satisfactory, as in John-
son v. Brink, supra. But the court in each case fails to mention an immediate re-lease.
It is also possible in the O'Kceffe'v and Rodcs cases that the, properties in question were
but a small part of the total trust res; if so, an unproductive period would not serionly
inconvenience the life tenants. The existence of other sources of income, however,
should not destroy the life tenant's rights to a reasonable income from these particular
properties.
16. Cases advocating apportionment over the remainder of the cancelled leae, v.hich
would lend support to the latter part of the proposed distribution, are: In re O'Kceffe's
Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201, 204 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Johnson v. Brinr:, -71 Ma's. 521,
529, 171 N. E. 717, 720 (1930) ; In re Rodes, [1909] 1 Cl. 815, 818-9, 78 L. J. Ch. 434,
436. See (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 872. The proceeds of the cancellation might b2 invested
pending the proposed distributions to the beneficiaries; interest on such investments would,
of course, be treated as income from the trust in the year in which it accrues.
17. The life tenant is generally allowed to recover income for the unproductive plriAo
between default of a mortgage and sale of the foreclosed property, on the theory that
the trustee, by failing to convert the defaulted mortgage into productive investments, has
effected an equitable conversion. By analogy, the trustee's cancellation of the lease and
subsequent retention of the property might also be an equitable conversion. On the sub-
ject of apportionment of proceeds of sales of unproductive trust assets generally, see
2 Scorr, T rusS (1939) §§ 240-1.3; 4 oOGERr, TRUsTs k%-D TRuSrEs (1935) § S25;
REsTATE.MrENT, TRusTs (1935) § 240; UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCO"!n ACT § 11; Bran-
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compensation to be given to the life tenant; perhaps the most equitable solu-
tion would be to pay the life tenant, during the period of unproductivity, a
portion of the settlement equal to the current rental value of the property.1 8
Manifestly, this situation falls within a category distinct from that in
which a lessee makes a payment not only for cancellation of his lease, but
also for the grant of a new, extended one.10 Under the latter, there is no
possibility of an unproductive period, and, generally, no question of a smaller
rental in the future. Since the lessee would have been willing, had he not
made the settlement, to pay a higher rental in the new lease, the settlement
actually represents advance rent,20 which in the absence of statute is not
apportionable. 21 Today, however, more than half the states recognize the
unfairness of treating advance rent as immediate income for the life tenant
and have made statutory provision for its apportionment between life tenant
and remainderman.22 Under these statutes courts have approved apportion-
ment of the settlements accompanying renewals, but have accepted the old
lease as the basis. 23 Such treatment is clearly inconsistent, for if the settle-
dis, Trust Administration: Apportionment of Proceeds of Sale of Unproductive Land
and of Expenses (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 127; Comment (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 275;
(1937) 5 U. OF CE. L. REv. 122.
18. Since the property is idle, the valuation would presumably be based upon the
current rentals of similar property. But see 2 Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) §241.3, indicating
that an amount equal to the rental required in the cancelled lease, or an amount equal
to the current return on trust investments of the same value as the property might be
more easily justified.
19. This was the situation in In re Archambault's Estate (No. 2), 232 Pa. 347, 81
Atl. 314, 36 L. R. A. (N.s.) 637 (1911) ; In re Wix, [1916] 1 Ch. 279, 85 L. J. Ch. 192:
Campbell v. Kawananakoa, 51 Haw. 500 (1930) ; Malcom v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 381 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1938). Cf. Johnson v. Brink, 271 Mass. 521, 171 N. E. 717 (1930) (new short-
term lease, at lower rental).
20. The income under the extended lease is thus reduced by the amount of the prepay-
ment, even when the new rental is higher than under the old lease. See In re Wix,
[1916] 1 Ch. 279, 288, 85 L. J. Ch. 192, 196. But cf. In re Archambault's Estate (No. 2),
232 Pa. 347, 350, 81 Atl. 314, 315, 36 L. R. A. (N.s.) 637, 639 (1911), "The remainder-
men have not been prejudiced in any way by the transaction." This latter view is appar-
ently approved in Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 343 Mo. 979, 986, 124 S. W.
(2d) 1198, 1202 (1938) and in In re O'Keeffe's Estate, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 201, 203 (Surr.
Ct. 1939).
21. Under the common law rule forbidding the apportionment of advance rent, the
entire amount is treated as immediate income for the life tenant. See RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1936) § 120, Comment c; In re Archambault's Estate (No. 2), 232 Pa. 347,
349, 81 Atl. 314, 315, 36 L. R. A. (N.s.) 637, 639 (1911). This rule has been vigorously
criticized. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 235.
22. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 120, comment d (for a list of states with
apportionment-of-rent statutes). UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcOMn ACT § 4 provides
for the apportionment of rent.
23. In re Wix, [1916] 1 Ch. 279, 85 L. J. Ch. 192; Malcom v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d)
381 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Apportionment over the remainder of the old lease has been
sanctioned in other cases. See Campbell v. Kawananakoa, 31 Haw. 500 (1930) (no
mention of common law); Johnson v. Brink, 271 Mass. 521, 171 N. E. 717 (1930)
(unexpired term of old lease same as term of new lease) ; In re Archambault's Estate
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ment is advance rent, it is related to the new lease and should be apportioned
accordingly.24 But more important is the fact that this alternative, clearly
permissible under the statute, is the equitable solution, since it would com-
pensate the remainderman for the reduced rental which he would receive
should the life tenant die during the term of the new lease.
(No. 2), 232 Pa. 347, 81 AtI. 314, 36 L.R.A. (N.s.) 637 (1911) (life tenant failed to
appeal lower court decision awarding apportionment over unexpired term of cancelled
lease).
24. A court could order the purchase of an annuity, payable to that beneficiary who
may be entitled to income from the trust at the time each installment of the annuity
falls due.
